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ABSTRACT 
Modern Lebanon’s political sectarian system is the result of many years of external forces 
molding the territory and its sociopolitical structures to align with international interests. Civic 
spaces in Lebanon, and women’s activity within these spaces, is dictated by sectarian dynamics 
within its politics and society. This paper explores the evolution of the Lebanese state and 
sectarianized experiences of citizenship in relation to the external forces that shaped the 
“Lebanese System” in place today.  
 
Beginning in the late Ottoman and French Mandate periods, it identifies the key players in state 
formation both under colonial rule and later, as a sovereign state, a failing state in civil war, a 
post-conflict society. Finally, it frames Lebanon as a case study in 21st-century Middle East 
politics. It argues that the sectarian sociopolitical structure and gendered social and legal 
understandings of citizenship preclude any unified experience of public life across the Lebanese 
system, and thus prevents women from engaging fully in both Lebanese civic life and of their 
position as citizens in the global system.  
 
It is crucial to understand the ways in which gendered, sectarian civic spaces have formed and 
continue to evolve as it is within these spaces where civil societies develop. This study identifies 
points of entry to civic life for women within the major Lebanese sects, as well as barriers to 
complete participation. It supports the consideration of gendered modes of civic participation 
within the larger framework of transnational politics, particularly in relation to Lebanon’s 
continued strategic importance to regional and international actors. 
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i 
PREFACE 
In scholarship and practice of development, statebuilding, and human rights, it has become 
fashionable to throw together buzzwords like “gender,” “civil society,” and “democracy.” While 
this study explores these very subjects, my hope is that it will bring light to the fundamental 
challenges contained within such concepts.  
Issues of women’s rights must not be ignored in our pursuit of a better world, but we must also 
recognize that they are not isolated problems. Rather, these issues stem from complex histories of 
colonialism, conflict, and international interests. It is only through an understanding of these 
catalysts that women’s advocates across the world can find solidarity and common ground. 
This work is dedicated to the women who demand a position in public life, to those who 
unapologetically participate in the movement toward a better world. In Lebanon and beyond, it 
is these women whose voices are transforming the role of gender in their communities and 
abroad. 
 
 “Women’s empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all 
spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to 
power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace.” 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action  
September 15, 1995 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the realm of democracy and citizen engagement in the Middle East, Lebanon’s is one of the 
most complex and fascinating cases. As one of the three “democratic founding regimes”1 of the 
decolonization period and one of the few democratic governments in the region today, the 
country is seen as “the most Westernized Arab nation”2 and an encouraging (if fragile) model of 
progress toward liberal democracy in the region. This reputation is upheld in most studies of the 
country's civil society, and Lebanon is considered “one of the most enabling legal and regulatory 
environments for civil society in the entire Arab world”3 as well as one of the leading states in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for women’s civic participation. However, while 
“[w]omen have historically been very active in civil society [and] have led some of the charity and 
humanitarian activities for a long time… the general stereotype is that women prevail in the 
social sphere while men prevail in other organizations, which are economic or political in 
nature.”4 Indeed, women’s participation in civil society and civic activity is limited by the 
gendered spheres of Lebanese society. 
This discrepancy can best be understood when we separately examine civil society, public 
life and civic space. It is therefore important to understand the ways in which civic spaces have 
been constructed within Lebanon itself throughout its complex history and within its sectarian 
political structures. How did Lebanon’s colonial history and early state formation influence the 
                                               
1 Michele Penner Angrist, “The Making of Middle East Politics,” in Politics and Society in the Contemporary 
Middle East, ed. Michele Penner Angrist (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2013). 
2 Hayfaa Tlaiss and Saleema Kauser, "The Impact of Gender, Family and Work on the Career Advancement 
of Lebanese Women Managers," in Gender Management: An International Journal 26, no. 1 (2011), 10. 
3 “NGO Monitor: Lebanon,” International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, June 20, 2015. 
4 Khaled Abou Assi, Lebanese Civil Society (Beirut: International Management and Training Institute for 
CIVICUS, 2006). PDF. 
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development of the political sectarian structures in existence today? What role does sectarianism 
play in shaping “private” and “public” life? Finally, in what ways are experiences of civic space in 
Lebanon gendered, and how do women in Lebanon navigate these spaces? 
Political sectarianism in Lebanon, which forms much of the foundation of its current 
political and cultural existence, is not organic; rather, it emerged as the result of colonial 
statecraft and geopolitical interests of international actors and has perpetuated itself due to elite 
power-sharing structures cultivated by these external influences. The fragmentation of Lebanese 
society that has become encoded in Lebanese life due to political sectarianism especially hinders 
women's participation in civic life and prevents a universal experience of citizenship and national 
identity. In Lebanon, navigating civic life is a delicate process in which sectarian cleavages 
institutionalized at the national level dictate the legal, political, and social structures within 
individual communities. These divides preclude any unified experience of public/private spheres 
across the Lebanese system.  
Sectarian identity is evident in all aspects of Lebanese society, integrating the personal 
into the political and vice versa in a pluralism that “is basically primordial, i.e. traditional, where 
cohesive family allegiances and confessional groups are mobilized to participate politically as 
autonomous groups in defense and maintenance of their distinct social and political identities.”5 
As Maya Mikdashi observes, “in the logic of the Lebanese state, a sect is both a historical 
                                               
5 Kamal E. Abouchedid, “Correlates of Religious Affiliation, Religiosity and Gender Role Attitudes Among 
Lebanese Christian and Muslim College Students,” Equal Opportunities International 26 no. 3 (2007): 196. 
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(oriented toward a private past) and a political (oriented toward a common future) identity.”6 
Thus, sectarian identity is directly intertwined with political identity in the Lebanese state. 
Lebanon as a Case Study in Non-Secular Civic Spaces 
While primarily a country study, this is ultimately an examination of the ways in which 
international interests impact statebuilding and civic participation. Although Lebanon’s 
particular sectarianization of sociopolitical structures is unique to that country, it is not the only 
non-secular state in the global system or the MENA region. Nor is it the only country to be 
profoundly impacted by colonial statecraft and postcolonial statebuilding. Thus, understanding 
the ways in which Lebanon’s civic spaces have formed, and the means by which Lebanese 
citizens navigate these spaces, allows us to better comprehend civil societies and civic life in other 
post-colonial multiconfessional states. 
It is within such a framework that more comprehensive studies can be conducted in the 
area of gender, civil society and state formation. While it is tempting to merge the three in the 
name of inclusivity, it is important to recognize that they are interwoven in complex and 
differing ways. In the example of Lebanon, it becomes clear that these aspects of society and civic 
life are mutually dependent rather than autonomous entities. By understanding the ways in 
which gendered sociopolitical structures and civil society influence each other outside of a 
Eurocentric liberal-democratic framework, we can begin to work toward more nuanced 
approaches to civic engagement at both the grassroots and transnational levels.  
                                               
6 Maya Mikdashi, "Sex and Sectarianism: The Legal Architecture of Lebanese Citizenship," Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 34, no. 2 (2014): 283. 
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Notes on Research and Methodology 
This study examines the sectarian sociopolitical frameworks that dictate the gendering of civic 
spaces in Lebanon. It does not attempt to generalize the variety of everyday lived experiences of 
Lebanese women, nor does it presume to argue for or against the merit of any one sectarian or 
secular approach to civic activity or public life. Rather, it assumes a multidisciplinary approach in 
an effort to avoid reliance on a singular lens of analysis, instead considering spaces available to 
organic movements within their relevant sociopolitical and cultural contexts.  
As a case study, this research focuses primarily on literature and reports pertaining to 
gender, civil society and civic life in country-specific and regional contexts. The research draws 
from literature by international as well as Lebanese scholars and evaluators, and includes 
academic literature, NGO reports, interview transcripts, and news sources. This approach allows 
for a more inclusive review of the intricate systems and histories outlined in the study. However, 
the scope of this research is relatively limited, as it relies on secondary qualitative studies to 
conduct an analysis of a deeply complicated topic. The limits in both length and research 
capabilities make a complete study of the many facets of this topic unfeasible. Thus, while the 
following paper strives to convey the nuances of this debate, it is still influenced by the relatively 
Western-biased worldviews of the researcher.  
Summary of Contents 
This paper begins by developing a foundation for the study of civic participation and gendered 
space outside of a Western liberal-secular framework. It then presents the historical background 
for this study, tracing the consolidation of a sectarian elite and the construction of a Maronite 
hegemony during the French Mandate period (1920-1943) and post-independence state 
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formation (1943-1975). The following sections look more closely at the interplay between 
gender, sectarianism and transnational influence in Lebanon’s more recent history and the 
present-day context. First, this paper examines the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1989) within the 
context of a sectarian proxy war. It outlines the multiple international patrons of the various 
militias and the ways in which these external interests influenced experiences of war. It also 
comments on the gendered aspects of the sectarian conflict.  
It will then utilize this background information in the case study, which expands on the 
consequences of the war by exploring civic life in the immediate postwar period (1990-2005), 
and the significant role of Syria and other international players in shaping sectarian citizenship in 
the post-conflict state. The study goes on to outline the gendered and sectarianized sociopolitical 
frameworks of Lebanon in the post-Cedar Revolution 21st century (2005-present). It examines in 
more detail the social and legal status of women in Lebanon, and the gendered modes of civic 
participation which continue to prevent a unified experience of citizenship or solidarity. This 
section also examines the present crisis of political sectarianism in Lebanon and its implications 
for the future of sectarian citizenship in the country. 
The extent to which women can participate in civic life depends on the parameters of the 
civic spaces available to them, and the barriers and points of entry contained within these 
frameworks. In the case of Lebanon, mapping the development of civic spaces requires an 
understanding of both internal and external influences on the sociopolitical structures of the 
country. These spaces did not form in a vacuum. Rather, they resulted from competing spheres 
of influence which shaped the Lebanese system as it exists today. Because of these influences, 
Lebanese identity coalesced around sectarian structures which cultivated differing social, cultural, 
and legal norms. The complex process of identity formation that occurred throughout the 20th 
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century led to the creation both of fragmented modes of citizenship and of sect-based structures 
of patriarchy, which continually produce gendered relationships with the state.  
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II. THEORIES AND DEFINITIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYSIS  
This study attempts to approach questions of gender and civic life in a comprehensive and 
interdisciplinary manner, employing theory in certain areas to form a foundation for analysis. It 
is important to note that one objective of this paper is to navigate the theories and terminology 
outlined below in a way that recognizes, and endeavors to operate outside of, the Eurocentric 
liberal-secular context in which most studies of civil society and civic engagement are based. It 
recognizes each of these entities as facets of broader structures, and thus demonstrates the ways 
in which they are interdependent. 
Navigating Civil Society 
Because this study is focused on the development of civic spaces and the ways in which women 
navigate within them, the term “civil society” will largely be used in the context of “associational 
life,” or the concrete manifestation of a civic consciousness through collective action and 
association. However, to ascribe only this attribute to the definition and study of civil society 
would be an over-simplification of the term to the point of futility. Civic space is a collective 
sphere influenced by all facets of civil society; thus, the idea of a civil society should be 
approached in its entirety, taking into account the range of discourses around the subject as well 
as the specific frameworks within which it will be analyzed.  
Discourses of Civil Society 
It is tempting to hold up civil society and civic engagement as the miracle solution to social and 
political instability, intrastate conflict, and economic insecurity. Indeed, Paul W.T. Kingston 
observes that “in the latter part of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the belief in the 
democratic potential of civil society has reached new heights, spawning all sorts of national and 
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international development programs aimed at its ‘strengthening’ and ‘deepening’.”1 However, 
civil societies are intertwined with the social, political, and cultural realities in which they must 
operate; as Michael Edwards warns, civil society aid should not be invoked as the “silver bullet” 
to eradicate inequality, secure world peace, or accomplish any of the number of ideals generally 
attributed to a “perfect” world order.2 To put it more bluntly: “blackmailing civil society actors 
with dollar signs is not an intelligent way to promote the rule of law, transparency, good 
governance, accountability and the acceptance of the principle of a peaceful succession of political 
power in which an independent civil society should be the main engine of the process.”3 
Yet civil society cannot be written off as a self-sustaining inevitability which is impervious 
to external actors both within and outside of the state. This sector fulfills an important role in 
human societies, as “collective action in search of the good society is a universal part of human 
experience, though manifested in a million different ways across time, space and culture.”4 Civic 
spaces, then, are a necessary component of human society, as they provide a platform from which 
civil society actors can pursue this “good society.” They are by no means independent forces 
within these spaces. 
As Sheila Carapico argues, “civil society is not a constant, unchanging cultural attribute, 
but rather a variable that changes shape and scope according to political and economic 
                                               
1 Paul W.T. Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism: Advocacy Networks and the Politics of Civil Society in 
Postwar Lebanon (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013), 7. 
2 Michael Edwards, Civil Society, 3rd edition (Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press 2014). 
3 Noureddine Jebnoun, “Civil Society in Arab Lands: By Ballot or by Bullet?” Jadaliyya, February 20, 2011. 
4 Edwards, Civil Society, 1. 
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circumstances.”5 Civil society – and with it, civic space – evolves to accommodate the 
sociopolitical realities of a given place and time. Not only does civil society adapt to 
accommodate these realities, but perceptions of its purpose and value to society as a whole will 
also vary across political orientations, value systems, and historical contexts.6 Thus, a civil society 
in a proto-democratic Middle East country in 2015 will operate differently and fulfill different 
roles than that of a Western European country in 1999. 
While the concept of “civil society” as it is understood today is relatively new (having 
arisen from waves of post–Cold War optimism in the 1990s)7, civil society itself, as well as the 
scholarship surrounding it, have long been elements of human societies. In his “History of Civil 
Society Ideas,” John Ehrenberg notes that the idea of a pluralistic civic space “constituted by the 
life of noble action” can be traced back as far as Aristotle.8 As Western political society 
developed, so did conceptualizations of this aspect of civic life and the relationship between 
states, markets and citizens. Civil society as it is understood and studied today is thus the product 
of a long evolution of Western political philosophy, duly focused on the development of civil 
society within a Western context. While Ehrenberg does not dispute the development of civil 
society outside of this framework, his analysis does not address alternate understandings of civil 
society and civic spaces.  
                                               
5 Sheila Carapico, "Civil Society," in Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East, ed. Michele 
Penner Angrist (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2013), 100. 
6 Edwards, Civil Society, 2. 
7 Thomas Carothers and Saskia Brechenmacher, “The Civil Society Flashpoint,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, March 6, 2014. 
8 John Ehrenberg, “A History of Civil Society Ideas,” in The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society ed. Michael 
Edwards (2011): Oxford Handbooks Online.   
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Perhaps, then, it is more useful to leverage Edwards’ three-part definition of civil society: 
as associational life, as the good society, and as the public sphere. This allows for more open 
interpretation and nuanced analysis of the term. First, it allows for an understanding of civil 
society as “a part of society that is distinct from states and markets,”9  that is, as associational life. 
This is the concept of civil society as voluntary, consensual involvement in groups, organizations, 
and associations. Although associations are not considered part of the state or market, they are 
not necessarily independent actors; indeed, argues Kingston, associational life is tied to the 
evolution of political economy and social frameworks within a state.10 
As Kingston demonstrates in his analysis of class structure and civil society in Lebanon, 
fragmentation within social structures poses a challenge to Edwards’ association of civil society 
with the “good society” as the use of the term “as shorthand for the kind of society in which we 
want to live.”11 In this definition, subjective indicators such as norms and values must be 
established to determine who is “in” and “out” of this society. In states with uneven or fractured 
social development, such a subjectivity leads to the fragmentation of civic spheres. Edwards does 
caution against idealization alone, arguing that “visions of the good society that rest on voluntary 
action alone will always be built on shifting sands,”12 and that interaction across institutions 
including family, government, firms and civil society is necessary for stability. However, cross-
sector interaction alone cannot mitigate the effects of social, economic, or cultural divides within 
                                               
9 Edwards, Civil Society, 19. 
10 Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism, 9-11. 
11 Edwards, Civil Society, 44. 
12 Ibid, 56. 
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a state structure. As Marie-Claude Thomas observes, “subgroups are formed when culture is 
located outside the popular comprehension; hence, an intellectual difference of opinion is created 
between classes that are not always entirely caught up.”13 The “good society,” much like 
associational life, is subject to these intellectual conflicts within and among social groups. 
In its third and final role, the public sphere, “civil society becomes the arena for argument 
and deliberation as well as for association and institutional collaboration.”14 Edwards argues that 
such a public forum is a necessary aspect of civic participation and conducive to more open 
societies. However, automatically restricting civil society and civic space to the public realm 
limits what can and cannot be considered “civic action.” The concept of the “public sphere” will 
be addressed in more detail later in this chapter, as it relates most directly to the intersection of 
gender and civic space. 
Civil Society in Context: The Middle East and Lebanon 
The theories and findings of civil society scholars, though helpful in developing a framework for 
study, are largely based on observations and interpretations of civil society in established Western 
liberal democracies. Thus, they cannot be transferred directly into study of post-colonial 
developing states or regions. In the context of the Middle East, Edwards notes the need to be 
wary of generalized statements about civil society in the region, as “the reality of associational life 
                                               
13 Marie-Claude Thomas, Women in Lebanon: Living with Christianity, Islam and Multiculturalism (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 204. 
14 Edwards, Civil Society, 67.  
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in non-western culture is one of ‘mix-and-match’ because they have been subject to so many 
external influences in both the colonial and postcolonial eras.”15  
Sheila Carapico expands on this notion, arguing that not only is civil society dynamic, but 
it is also not inherently liberal, progressive, or even democratic.16 That is to say that democracy is 
not a requirement for civic spaces, thus opening up the study of civil society and civic 
engagement to nondemocratic or protodemocratic frameworks. However, this requires a 
definitional restructuring of civic space to include areas traditionally discarded as non-political 
(i.e. contained within the “private sphere”), such as social services, as well as digital and 
transnational civic arenas. Carapico argues that the rich culture of Abrahamic faith-based civic 
activity and philanthropic traditions of the Middle East, as well as the new spaces created by 
decolonization and the emergence of market economies in the region allowed for the expansion 
of these spaces despite the rise of nondemocratic governments in the latter half of the 20th 
century.17 Nevertheless, observes Eberhard Kienle, “authoritarian rule and strong non-voluntary 
forms of social organization [in the region] continue to impose significant limits on independent 
associational life and the strength of public spheres.”18 While the processes of statebuilding in the 
mid- to late-20th century may have opened new avenues for civic participation, ultimately this 
aspect of society continues to be impacted by the legacies of colonial political technologies and 
early state formation. 
                                               
15 Ibid, 33  
16 Carapico, “Civil Society.” 
17 Ibid. 
18 Eberhard Kienle, “Civil Society in the Middle East,” In The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society ed. Michael 
Edwards (2011): Oxford Handbooks Online. 
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Indeed, civil society in the Middle East cannot be considered in a binary of state and 
nonstate actors. In postcolonial states, civil society is inextricably linked with state formation, 
particularly within new democracies and protodemocratic frameworks. In this political climate, 
“interest groups and other civic associations allow citizens to monitor government actions, 
articulate and aggregate interests, and exert political influence… [while] norms of governance 
have not been well established and power can be easily abused.”19 Because of the ongoing colonial 
legacies and the sociopolitical structures that shape these states, it is often difficult to distinguish 
civil society from other sectors. It is “an open-ended and disaggregated concept whose coherence 
and autonomy are highly compromised by the interpretations of the market and the state.”20  
Just as the potential for a civil society to exist within a nondemocratic framework must be 
considered, so must the idea of a nonsecular civil society be examined. Particularly in the context 
of Lebanon, it is difficult to analyze any aspect of civil society and associational life without 
considering organizations that “have represented the concerns of nonvoluntary ‘imagined 
communities’ based on language or religion rather than citizenship.”21 The enigma of the 
nonsecular civic space is a major component of civic discourse in the sectarian state, and presents 
a significant challenge to the development of cross-sectarian civic spaces. As Donald E. Miller 
observes, although civil societies can be enriched by “vibrant institutional religion [that] engages 
                                               
19 Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao: "Democracy and the Political Culture Orientation of Ordinary Citizens: A 
Typology for the Arab World and Perhaps Beyond," in Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research 
and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens, ed. Mark Tessler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2011), 169. 
20 Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism. 
21 Kienle, “Middle East,” 3 
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‘the spirit’ at both the organizational and individual levels,” this same institution “has the 
potential to inflict great harm, especially if it becomes an instrument of the state or an uncritical 
advocate for sectarian or corporate interests.” 22 It is this through the lens of this delicate balance 
between religious identity, citizenship and civil society that Lebanese society and politics can be 
studied. 
Parameters of Sectarianism and Secularism 
Much like the term “civil society,” both “consociationalism” (or “sectarianism”) and “secularism” 
are broad terms which must be persistently redefined and contextualized; this study will refer to 
these terms exclusively in the context of the Lebanese state. However, since “sectarian politics 
take multiple forms, operate at multiple levels of a political system, and, as a result, have multiple 
histories,”23 even this restriction requires clarification of historical, cultural and geographic 
frameworks. 
Consociationalism and Political Sectarianism 
Suad Joseph argues that “sectarianism is about how ‘differences’ are constructed; because people 
can believe they are very different when they are not, the task of the scholar is to describe what 
differences do exist, how they emerged, and why people believe they are different.”24 Thus, the 
task of framing political sectarianism for study must take into account not only the perceived 
divisions within a society, but also the ways in which citizens and institutions interact within and 
across supposed communal boundaries. With sectarianism rooted in communal identity, this 
                                               
22 Donald E. Miller, “Civil Society and Religion,” In The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society edited by Michael 
Edwards (2011): Oxford Handbooks Online. 
23 Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism, 23 
24 Suad Joseph, “Pensee 2: Sectarianism as Imagined Sociological Concept and as Imagined Social 
Formation,” Journal of Middle East Studies 40 no. 4 (2008). 553-554. 
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structure will differ depending on the identity groups contained within it. It is for this reason 
that this study defines not only the concept of consociationalism and sectarianism, but also the 
structure of political sectarianism within the specific context of the Lebanese state.  
Sectarianism in its most fundamental definition is a specific kind of consociationalism, a 
form of government in which “national identity… is deeply contested and political allegiance is 
fragmented along communal lines rather than being embedded in a single centralized national 
authority;”25 Kingston defines consociationalism as “regime types that revolve around the formal 
sharing of political power between different religious (and… perhaps also ethnic) 
communities.”26 A consociational government arises from a “highly pluralist”27 society which 
comprises several minorities as a means by which to guarantee political representation of all 
groups and to prevent any one group from seizing power over the state.  
Consociationalism and sectarianism are not necessarily organic structures. Salamey and 
Tabar argue that consociationalism is presented as “a means to establish a democracy that works 
to preserve the autonomy of groups, while maintaining a sense of a collective nationhood;”28 yet 
it is also a structure that has historically served the political interests of imperial powers and 
political elites.29 Kingston further argues that “sectarianism has been ‘constructed’ and ‘produced’ 
by various socioeconomic and political factors (and, hence, also can be ‘unmade’);”30 Salloukh et. 
                                               
25 Salamey, Politics & Government, 7 
26 Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism, 22. 
27 “Consociationalism,” in Dictionary of the Social Sciences, ed. Craig Calhoun (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 89. 
28 Imad Salamey and Paul Tabar, "Democratic Transition and Sectarian Populism: The Case of Lebanon," 
in Contemporary Arab Affairs 5 no. 4 (2012): 500. 
29 Maya Mikdashi. “What is Political Sectarianism?” Jadaliyya March 25, 2011. 
30 Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism, 22. 
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al, while agreeing with this premise, argue that the Lebanese sectarian political economy is 
cyclical in that it “sustains a stubborn institutional and clientelist complex, enables the 
sectarian/political elite to reproduce sectarian identities and institutional dynamics, and exposes 
the country to external manipulations, geopolitical contests, and perpetual crisis.”31 Sectarianism, 
then, is the institutionalization of constructed communal identities which can then be 
manipulated and reproduced both internally and externally. It is not merely the natural or 
expected outcome of a pluralistic, multiconfessional society. 
A study of sectarianism, although employing religious identity and custom, must be 
decoupled from the study of individuals’ relationship with and practice of spirituality. Joseph’s 
observation that “the slippery slope between sect as social organization and religion as theology 
continues to lead to analytical slippages between the deployment of ‘sectarianism’ and ‘religion’ as 
conceptual tools”32 demonstrates the importance of this distinction. It is for this purpose that the 
term “political sectarianism” may be introduced to distinguish the sectarian framework of 
Lebanon as “a political technology that claims to represent, channel, and thus transcend the 
sectarian prison that Lebanese citizens are… enclosed within.”33 In other words, employing 
political sectarianism as an analytical tool allows us to examine state-established sectarian 
classification from individual religious (or non-religious) identity. 
Finally, it is important to note that sectarianism, while a driving force behind politics and 
society in Lebanon, is not the only contributor to violence and social tensions in the country.34 
                                               
31 Bassel F. Salloukh et. al, The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 
2-3. 
32 Joseph, “Sectarianism as Imagined,” 2. 
33 Mikdashi, “Political Sectarianism.” 
34 Ibid. 
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To ascribe all conflicts and challenges to “sectarian tensions” is to overlook a complex history of 
intercommunal relations as well as both national and international power structures. Sectarianism 
is not a blanket explanation for the complex and fragile social structures of the country, but 
rather one of many catalysts. 
Secularism 
Secularism in this study refers not to the absence of a religious identity, but rather the 
reconciliation of these identities under a unified, rather than sectarian fragmented, political 
structure. That is, religion may still exist as a fundamental aspect of public life in a secular 
political system. It is simply not the primary defining feature of structures of law and governance. 
This is in contrast to normative Western understandings of “secularism,” which “[do] not quite 
translate into better understanding of the dynamics of secularism as a political project in the 
Middle East, and the complexities and contradictions of lived secularity there.”35 Maia Carter 
Hallward notes that “Western IR scholars often take the ‘secular’ (often seen through Western 
Protestant lenses) for granted; rarely do we consider how the boundaries of the ‘secular’ are 
defined and deployed in scholarship and policy.”36  
Thus, much like sectarianism, secularism must be analyzed within relevant cultural and 
sociopolitical contexts. First, it must be noted that secularism is a political doctrine,37 and 
therefore carries with it implications of political structures and institutions. Secularism cannot 
                                               
35 Stacey Gutkowski, “It’s Not All About Islam: Misreading Secular Politics in the Middle East,” Open 
Democracy, April 25, 2015. 
36 Maia Carter Hallward, “Situating the ‘Secular’: Negotiating the Boundary between Religion and Politics,” 
International Political Sociology 2 (2008): 1. 
37 Akeel Bilgrami, “Secularism: Its Context and Content,” Journal of Social Philosophy 45 no. 1 (2008): 26.  
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exist independently of the state. Further, while political secularism does offer an alternative to 
sectarianism, it is not the ultimate solution to the challenges presented by sectarian political 
structures. As Mikdashi notes, “you can have a secular state that is sexist, hyper capitalist, racist, 
xenophobic, patriarchal, oppressive and repressive of public opinion.”38 Even within the context 
of political sectarian structures such as that of Lebanon, civil (secular) laws can be equally, if not 
“more wide reaching,”39 than religious legal codes.  
Theories of Gender and Civic Space 
The final framework to be incorporated into this study is feminist and gender theory. Particularly 
relevant is scholarship in this field that considers feminist consciousness outside of the 
hegemonic Western context. While this study does not directly contribute to this discourse, it 
does attempt to examine women’s relationship to civic space in the specific context of Lebanon. 
Thus, the analysis presented employs elements of gender theory as a means of navigating 
complex sociopolitical systems and cultural norms in order to “not fall into polarizations that 
place feminism on the side of the West.”40 
Agency, Empowerment and Liberation 
In her essay “How Not to Study Gender in the Middle East,” Maya Mikdashi summarizes the 
need for a framework that exceeds Western assumptions as such: “liberal feminism’s assumptions 
as to what constitutes ‘feminist politics’ or ‘feminist causes’ are at best flawed. At worst they are 
                                               
38 Mikdashi, “Political Sectarianism.” 
39 Maya Mikdashi, "How Not to Study Gender in the Middle East," Jadaliyya, March 31, 2012. 
40 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural 
Relativism and its Others,” American Anthropologist 104 no. 3 (2002): 788. 
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exercises in epistemological hegemony and the violent remaking of the world according to 
secular and neoliberal rights frameworks.”41 In order to best avoid making such assumptions, it is 
necessary to explore different understandings of key terms often employed in the study of 
women’s status across the world. 
It is tempting to describe and apply the term “agency” within this hegemonic paradigm; 
indeed, this has often been the case in discourses of women’s rights even in reference to non-
western societies. However, if agency is to be understood as personal freedom, then 
understandings of agency must be open to interpretation depending on social, cultural and even 
individual circumstances.42 In other words, “it is crucial to detach the notions of agency from the 
goals of progressive politics.”43 Suad Joseph goes even further in critiquing notions of agency, 
suggesting the addition of “intentionality” to discourses of oppression as this “invites a probe into 
before and during actions.”44  
Considerations of agency and the discourse surrounding it are crucial in defining the ways 
in which women negotiate their position in public and political realms. It is a concept that 
provides a framework for studying differing perceptions and means of civic life across cultural 
boundaries. However, Abu-Lughod cautions against falling back on pure cultural relativism – 
that is, attributing practices perceived as oppressive or unjust to “just the culture” – to account for 
                                               
41 Mikdashi, “How Not to Study Gender.” 
42 Abu-Lughod, “Muslim Women,” 786. 
43 Saba Mahmood, “Feminist Theory, Agency, and the Liberatory Subject: Some Reflections on the Islamic 
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these differences. She notes that many of these practices, including the dominance of social 
conservatism and even violent extremism, are not the results of isolated social development. It is 
colonial statecraft, not isolated cultural evolution (or stagnation), that facilitated intercommunal 
conflict and conservative ideologies in the region.45 It is through such approaches that Western 
actors, no matter how well-intentioned, risk adopting missions of “empowerment” which in 
reality merely change the type of inequality women experience. This is exemplified in a global 
survey of women's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) published in 2015, in which Ruth 
Phillips concluded that “there is a lively engagement with feminisms within women's NGOs… 
and the feminist objectives of the NGOs are at odds with what can be seen as the dominant 
policy framework of empowerment as a means to gender equality.”46  
Many scholars of Middle East women’s studies argue that the dissonance between 
perceived needs and functional applications of development efforts is reminiscent of “colonial 
feminism” and the practice of “[utilizing] the ‘question of women’ to legitimize foreign 
intervention, occupation and influences… through the rhetoric of progress, development, 
economic growth and neoliberalism.”47 Indeed, much of the rhetoric of “liberation” leveraged by 
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46 Ruth Phillips, "How 'Empowerment' May Miss its Mark: Gender Equality Policies and How They Are 
Understood in Women's NGOs," in VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit 
Organizations 26, no. 4 (2015): 1141. 
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Western actors of the 21st century reflects this fabrication of “otherness” through a perceived 
oppression of women.48 
Public-Private Spheres and Civic Space 
In exploring intersections of gender, citizenship and civic life, particularly within the context of 
Lebanon, we must also recognize conceptualizations of the public and private as both distinctive 
and overlapping entities. As Edwards notes, “all societies possess a range of [public spheres] at 
different levels.”49 Equally important is the existence of a private sphere, as “the public realm 
cannot be fully understood in the absence of the private sphere, and, similarly, the meaning of 
the original [social] contract is misinterpreted without both mutually dependent halves of the 
story.”50  This study will examine the interactions that occur both within and among these 
spheres.  
In its most basic definition, the public sphere is understood as the male-gendered, 
predominantly political sphere of a society. For example, a World Bank report on gender equality 
in the MENA region argues that “the public sphere is the sphere of power, influence, and 
patronage and, as such, has been traditionally reserved for men,” and that “a call for gender 
equality is effectively a ‘transgression’ of women into this space and a claim to share power and 
                                               
48 Abu-Lughod unpacks this argument by demonstrating the ways in which discourses of “liberation,” 
particularly in relation to “oppressed” Muslim women in countries such as Afghanistan, serve as a 21st-
century extension of this colonial discourse. See Abu-Lughod, “Muslim Women,” 784. 
49 Edwards, Civil Society, 69. 
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control.”51 Lina Khatib expands upon this definition, arguing that “because politics is identified 
with a male public sphere, democracy itself becomes associated with men.”52  
Although both the public and private spheres contain specific, highly gendered attributes, 
they are not clearly delineated aspects of society. Two central points should be considered here. 
First, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, citizenship and civic life are shaped by the 
interaction of what is perceived as the “public” and the “private.” That is to say, as Edwards 
observes, “one cannot ignore private interests or identities in order to make a public… nor can 
groups that have been historically isolated and marginalized be expected to enter the public 
sphere on equal terms.”53 
Second, because of the fluidity of the public and private, there is also a gray area between 
the political and the non-political. Indeed, Joseph argues that “the imagined binary between 
public and private conflates multiple domains of social activity in such a way as to gloss gender 
issues, particularly by glossing the impact of systems of gendered domination across social 
fields.”54 The polarization of the public-private removes what is considered “private” from the 
political realm entirely,55 despite the frequent overlap of the two. Due to this ambiguity in what 
is and is not “public” or “political,” strictly defining what is and is not civic space becomes a 
difficult task. This study will focus largely on the ways in which women function as citizens 
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52 Lena Khatib, "Gender, Citizenship and Political Agency in Lebanon," British Journal of Middle East 
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within the public/private frameworks of their own societies, but this too remains open to 
interpretation. 
Because of these ambiguities, this study will primarily use the term “civic space” to 
include what is perceived to be public as well as private. While it is necessary to make the 
distinction between what is seen as public (i.e. male) space and private (i.e. female) space, it is 
difficult to discuss these distinctions in practical terms, as they stem from a constructed binary 
which, in reality, is often blurred. In the following chapters, “public sphere” and “private sphere” 
will refer to the social and cultural constructions of the public-private, while “civic space” leaves 
open the possibility of a convergence of the two. With this, it becomes possible to argue that 
women can enter civic spaces through what is often perceived to be the private (such as domestic 
spaces and motherhood). 
Summary 
In a study which encompasses both sectarian politics and gender, the key terms and concepts 
which drive the research and analysis cannot be approached from a single angle. Indeed, it is the 
complex nature of these ideas that necessitates such a project. Widening these definitions creates 
a space for further interpretation of civil society, gender, and identity theories within new social, 
cultural, and political contexts. 
Therefore, the following analysis will not attempt to construct firm definitions, but rather 
will endeavor to navigate among these dynamic concepts. In examining civil society, it is crucial 
not only to take into consideration the myriad actors contained within this sector, but also to 
think about the ways in which it may function outside of the context of secular Western 
democracies. Although this project looks primarily at associational life as a means of representing 
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civic engagement, even this does not exist as an isolated entity. Civil associations and those who 
participate in them interact with other aspects of the society in which they operate, whether this 
be legal institutions or cultural frameworks. Thus, in this study in particular, it is also important 
to maintain a “slippery definition”56 of the terms “sectarianism” and “secularism” in order to 
better understand the complex sociopolitical frameworks in which Lebanese civil society 
operates. Most important in this endeavor is to distinguish political sectarianism and secularism 
from individual religious identity. As we will see in later chapters, “sectarian identity” in this 
context refers to the ways in which citizenship is defined by sect-based categories.  
Finally, this project works at the intersection of political activity and cultural frameworks. 
Thus, although it is not exclusively a study of gender, it should take into account the 
multifaceted nature of gendered citizenship in terms of agency (or better, intentionality) and 
oppression. It will also account for the overlapping nature of the public and the private, especially 
in the context of a state in which much of what would be considered “private” has come to play a 
prominent role in the political realm, by focusing on the existence of a “civic space.”  
Because identity is so deeply engrained in Lebanese sociopolitical structures, it is virtually 
impossible to decouple the personal from the political. Colonial statecraft and the perpetration of 
a sectarian elite through the 20th century and into the 21st constructed parameters of civic space 
that were fractured along sectarian lines. Within these spaces emerged sectarianized structures of 
patriarchy which implemented barriers to civic life for Lebanese women. Although these 
structures share similar traits, they exist independently within individual sects, preventing unified 
experiences of civic life and thus barring women from mobilizing under any collective identity. 
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III. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF LEBANESE POLITICAL 
SECTARIANISM 
Imperial Statecraft: Foundations of a Sectarian State 
Although Lebanon is not the only consociational political system in the post-colonial world, it is 
among the earliest.1 This can be largely attributed to the statecraft employed by French powers in 
the Mandate period of the 1920s and ‘30s; however, the internal divisions of the Ottoman period 
which preceded the “political technologies”2 of French control should not be dismissed as 
insignificant. It is these preexisting social and cultural structures that provided a foundation for 
this construction. Due to this foundation, the French annexation of territories around Mount 
Lebanon to form Greater Lebanon had profound effects not only on the demographic 
construction of Mandate Lebanon, but also on the development of a new national identity. 
Mount Lebanon in the Ottoman Period 
It is important to note that the concept of democracy and republican ideals was relatively well-
established in Lebanon before the enactment French Mandate rule in the 1920s.3 While under 
the Ottoman Empire, the territory of Mount Lebanon held close ties with European states 
because of the Maronite Christian population.4 Additionally, the territory of Mount Lebanon 
and parts of Transjordan that fell within the constructed borders of modern Lebanon in the 
colonial era were inhabited by highly multiconfessional societies. The religious communities of 
                                               
1 Salamey and Tabar, “Democratic Transition and Sectarian Populism,” 500.  
2 Mikdashi, “Political Sectarianism.” 
3 Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism, 25. 
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Mount Lebanon (Maronite, Druze and Shi’a), while self-governing in their own communities,5 
also had socioeconomic ties across communal lines.6  
An early political sectarianism began to emerge in the mid- to late-19th century. It is 
during this period that the territory was divided along sectarian fractures following 
intercommunal disputes.7 The qa’imaqam (two-district) system introduced in 1842 divided 
Maronite and Druze populations, thus politicizing what was before a largely cultural identity.8 
These early “communal power-sharing institutions” sparked “profound transformations in the 
area’s political field in which democratic and sectarian governance principles came to be 
conjoined.”9 The political-sectarian divides imposed by the Ottoman powers ultimately 
necessitated the formation of a multisectarian system of rule in order to quell the rise in 
intercommunal violence.10 Confessional divides remained as the Ottoman Empire fell, replacing 
its control in the region with French Mandate rule. 
Sectarian Statecraft in Mandate Lebanon 
While existing social divisions did contribute to the creation of a sectarian form of governance, 
Lebanon’s history of colonialism and external statecraft in the 20th century was instrumental in 
shaping the political sectarian system of modern Lebanon. During French colonization after 
World War I, communal divides were leveraged as a means of implementing colonial policy and 
                                               
5 David Hirst, Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East (London: Faber and Faber 
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shaping politics and society under a largely authoritarian rule.11 By exploiting existing sectarian 
cleavages, French colonial powers were able to implement a strategy of “divide and rule” which 
further cultivated a class of sectarian elite and “the penetration of factionalized elite power deep 
into the Lebanese state.”12 Kingston describes this French influence as promoting “sectarianism 
from above” (the “reimposition of sectarian democracy”) and “sectarianism from below” 
(leveraging civil and political society to carry out sectarian policy).13 
The French expansion of the territory from Mount Lebanon to “Greater Lebanon” 
(incorporating what had formerly been parts of Syria and nearly doubling the size of the state14) 
fueled intercommunal tensions by incorporating Muslims of largely pan-Arab identities into this 
Maronite-led society.15 With this territorial expansion, the society comprised groups of various 
backgrounds and identities stitched together under the overarching designation of Greater 
Lebanon. While the newly added Muslim populations opposed the annexation and continued to 
align themselves with pan-Arab nationalisms, the Christians of Mount Lebanon, finding 
themselves crowded out by new Muslim majorities, expanded upon a budding Christian 
nationalism. Their nationalist identity was rooted largely in the Maronites’ indigenous claims to 
the territory and an ideology of “Phoenicianism,” an historicist ideology “based on the belief that 
the Lebanese political entity is … not the product of the twentieth century.”16  Indeed, Asher 
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Kaufman argues that it is Phoenicianism that linked Maronite communities with French colonial 
powers both politically and culturally.17 
The Mandate era saw the drafting of the Lebanese Constitution in 1926, which was 
primarily an undertaking of French and Christian elites, and which integrated both democratic 
ideals and sectarian provisions. With this constitution, intended to shape the country in the mold 
of the French Third Republic, Lebanon was among the earliest emerging countries of the post-
WWI international system to implement a democratic political framework.18 In an effort to 
encompass the multiethnic structure of Lebanese society in this foundational document, the 
constitution further fractured the confessional system by “bypassing the historical development of 
the two main ethnic-nationalisms … [and recognizing] instead the existence of seventeen 
religious communities.”19 Political association within the new Lebanese nation-state was no 
longer a binary of Franco-Christian or pan-Arab allegiances, but a collection of politicized 
confessional identities. Although not explicitly sectarian or consociationalist, this constitution 
formed the foundation for sectarian divisions of power in favor of the Maronite communities by 
delegating a significant portion of state power to the office of President, which was held by the 
Maronites.20 
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Because of their separation from the pan-Arab movement, Christian communities 
enjoyed almost exclusive participation in the statebuilding process of the early Mandate period.21 
Christian elites leveraged their historic relationship with France to promote a vision of an 
independent, separate Lebanese state, based extensively on Christian ideologies of Lebanese 
nationalism. This concept stood in stark contrast to the aspirations of the Muslim communities 
who continued to see themselves primarily as Syrian and favored integration into Arab Syria. 22 
Thus, even in the earliest stages of its development, modern Lebanon was defined by a 
politicization of sectarian interests. The French territory was split into “ethnically divided mini-
states”23  in order to prevent a consolidated, unified resistance to colonial rule. Within these 
divides, factionalized civic spaces also began to emerge, though civic activity within the state was 
conducted largely by Christian elites. It is within this sociopolitical context that an independent 
Lebanese state emerged in the early 1940s, with complete autonomy recognized on November 
22, 1943.24  
Consociational Power-Sharing and the Birth of Modern Lebanon 
By the mid-1930s, both Lebanese civic life and relations with French powers began to change. 
Within Lebanon, the Muslim communities began to participate more directly in Lebanese 
political life, and considerations of compromise with Christian political powers began to emerge 
in the Muslim political agenda.25 Further, with the onset of WWII in Europe, French influence 
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in Lebanon was declining, leaving the Maronites more socially and politically vulnerable. These 
developments eventually led to the rise of the right-wing, Lebanese nationalist Phalange 
(Kata’eb) party, which (at least initially) worked with its Muslim counterparts to advocate for 
Lebanese independence from French colonial rule.26 
After independence, sectarian divides were institutionalized and continued to dictate civic 
life as France’s colonial policies and the leveraging of factionalized elite carried over into the 
formation of the independent Lebanese state. The 1943 National Pact between the sectarian 
elite established a power-sharing agreement among the seventeen recognized sects in “an historic 
compromise” in which both Christians and Muslims renounced external ties (to Western powers 
and to pan-Arab allegiances, respectively).27 The pact also established a proportional power-
sharing mechanism in which the political offices were allocated by sect: Maronites were given the 
presidency, Sunni Muslims the office of the Prime Minister, and Shi’a Muslims the Speaker of 
Parliament. With this allocation of power, sectarian divisions were enshrined at the highest levels 
of governance in the emerging independent state. 
Lebanese social and political life was thus grounded in a precarious foundation of 
contesting identity, with Christians maintaining an ideology of Lebanese (i.e. Lebanese 
Christian) exceptionality and the Muslims adhering to a collective Arab identity.28 The division 
of power impacted each sectarian community in different ways. While drawing concessions from 
both pan-Arab and Christian nationalist groups, the National Pact ultimately favored the 
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Christians not only by giving them the presidency, but also by assigning a proportional advantage 
in a six-to-five system of representation.29  
The Maronite hegemony thus penetrated the structure of the independent state, despite 
their slipping claim to demographic majority. Conversely, the Shi’a communities, despite their 
growing numbers, were given the lowest position among the three major sects. Thus, the Shi’a 
experience in both the social and political spheres remained primarily one of otherness, a 
contributing factor to the development of a distinctive Shi’a nationalism “in which Lebanese 
Shi'ites [broke] with the dominant national narrative of Maronite Lebanon … and [aimed] to 
establish a national narrative dominated by Lebanese Shi'ite visions of morality, themes and 
symbolism.”30  
Following the formation of the Pact, Lebanon continued to struggle to define a coherent 
national identity. Among Christian communities, the Lebanese-Christian identity began to 
fracture in perceptions of nationhood: the “Arab-leftist” ideology which aligned with pan-
Arabism, and the more mainstream right-wing “Lebanonist” philosophy. This divide “moved the 
center of gravity in the Christian traditional debate from the notion of a totally independent 
Lebanon to the search for a compromise between ‘Lebanonism’ and ‘Arabism.’”31 
The Shi’ites continued to face marginalization in the Maronite-dominated society. The 
Shi’a elite who did hold influence “were feudal traditional leaders disconnected from the realities 
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of their constituency,”32 which left the largely rural Shi’a population with little connection to the 
political and social development of their country. These communities were further disadvantaged 
as tensions in the predominantly Shi’a south forced many inhabitants to migrate to the southern 
suburbs of Beirut as conflict with Israel escalated.33  
 The Shihabist administration (1958-1970)34 attempted to implement cross-sectarian 
national sentiment, but by 1970 power returned to the hands of the political sectarian elite and 
these efforts faded in favor of sect-based identity structures.35 Combined with the continued 
political uncertainty of the new state, persisting sectarian means of dictating political and social 
life pushed these divisions beyond intercommunal tensions into a fifteen-year civil war that 
shifted the Lebanese sociopolitical landscape and leveraged a tangible threat to the Christian 
hegemony in the Lebanese system. 
 
                                               
32 Marie Claude Thomas, Women in Lebanon: Living with Christianity, Islam and Multiculturalism (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 89 
33 Hirst, Beware of Small States, 95 
34 See also Kingston, Reproducing Sectarianism, 39. 
35 Bassel Salloukh, et. al., The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 
19. 
  Dick | 34 
 
IV. LEBANON'S CIVIL WAR AS A SECTARIAN PROXY WAR 
1975: Sectarianism Implodes 
The fifteen-year Lebanese Civil War splintered the urban landscape into sectarian battlegrounds 
for factional militias. The year 1975 saw the proliferation of intercommunal conflict between 
multiple factions of Lebanese society, specifically between conservative Maronite Christians, 
Palestinians1 and Muslim reformists.2 The “intensifying cycle of tit-for-tat atrocities” ultimately 
evolved into a full-scale civil war with the Black Saturday attacks in December 1975.3 The 
ensuing war polarized identity groups as Maronite, Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, Palestinian, and other 
militias both sectarian and secular fought for power in a demographic free-for-all. Sectarianism 
was no longer an accommodation of public life; it became the primary means by which public 
spaces were delineated and navigated.  
While sectarian divisions served as fuel for much of the conflict, the underlying causes 
were much more complex. Intersectarian tensions increased the conflict as the multiconfessional 
governmental structure collapsed and sectarian identities were manipulated to service the end 
goals of both domestic and external actors. Spheres of influence were meticulously cultivated as 
these interests merged and collided. The war illuminated the complex web of influence and 
interests among sectarian elite and international interests that had driven Lebanese politics and 
society since the Mandate period. 
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Within national borders, militias quickly consolidated under factional allegiances. 
Muslim Arab nationalists of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) rallied in support of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the “Common Forces” alliance.4 In the early 
stages of the war, this alliance fought a coalition of right-wing Christian militants known as the 
National Front (LF), consisting of Bashir Gemayel’s Phalangists (Kata’eb), Camille Chamoun’s 
Tigers, and President Suleiman Frangieh’s personal militia known as the Marada Brigade.5 As 
the largest and most powerful of these groups, the Kata’eb soon absorbed or wiped out the other 
militias, and the LF emerged as a predominately right-wing Phalangist force.6 The rise of Shi’a 
militia movements in the late 70s and 80s, in the form of Amal and later Hezbollah, further 
complicated the militarized sectarian landscape, as they were aligned with neither the LNM nor 
the Christian militias.7 The increasingly diverging interests of the two Shi’a factions only further 
agitated the conflict. 
It is clear that the civil conflict was far more complicated than a mere Christian/Muslim 
split. Indeed, “it is more accurate to describe [the warring factions] as pro- and anti-status quo.”8 
These inter- and intrasectarian geographic and ideological turf wars opened the conflict to 
outside players as well, as each faction sought to gain leverage over a vast array of competitors to 
influence this status quo. As conflict flared in Lebanon at the height of the civil war, both 
                                               
4 Salamey, Government and Politics, 45. 
5 Ibid, 43. 
6 Wegner, “Lebanon’s 15-Year Civil War.”  
7 Salamey, Government and Politics, 45. 
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regional and international actors seized the opportunity to mold the outcome to their own 
strategic interests. 
Civil War, Regional Battlefield 
While the conflict was predominately a civil war, it was not an isolated one. International players 
also had stakes in the outcome of the war: the central role of the PLO led Israel to see the 
conflict as an extension of its own battle against Palestinian resistance; Iran supported Hezbollah 
in their effort to build an Islamic state in Lebanon; the United States saw Lebanon as a key 
component of its intelligence and security strategies in the Arab world; and Syria feared the loss 
of its hegemony in the area.9 With the introduction of outside influences, sectarian divisions 
became further agitated as they were manipulated by external interests. 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict on Lebanese Soil 
Although the conflict was among intrastate actors, it is the transnational nature of the underlying 
tensions that played a key role in launching the civil war. Initially, much of the conflict pitted 
right-wing Christian (Maronite) nationalists against the PLO and its primarily Sunni Muslim 
supporters.10 This positioned the conflict not as an exclusively intersectarian Sunni/Christian 
divide, but rather as a consequence of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Christian factions had acted as proxies for Israeli interests in the territory even before the 
outbreak of the 1975 war.11 With the eruption of the conflict, Israel played a more active role by 
                                               
9 Martha Wegner, “Primer: Lebanon’s 15-Year War, 1975-1990,” Middle East Report 162 (1990).  
10 Geraint Hughes, “Lebanon, 1975-1990,” in Geraint Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy: Proxy Warfare in 
International Politics (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 88. 
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sponsoring the Kata’eb party and establishing the South Lebanon Army.12 This external support 
allowed Christian militants to compensate for their numerical disadvantage against the combined 
PLO and Sunni Muslim forces. Israel, in turn, sought to bolster its presence in the region by 
cultivating support among the more sympathetic Christian populations.13 
This special relationship was most discernible in Israeli support of Phalangist LF leader 
Bashir Gemayel, “the first Maronite leader ever to command undisputed, autocratic sway over 
the whole [Maronite] community.”14 When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, they installed the 
pro-Zionist Gemayel as president intending to “reestablish Maronite Christian hegemony over 
Lebanon” and ultimately create a bilateral peace agreement. With this strategy, Israel bolstered 
the Kata’eb hegemony over the Maronite ethnic identity while also increasing tensions with 
Palestinian, Syrian and other anti-Israeli factions.  
As Israel further cultivated Maronite power in the territory, it simultaneously reproduced 
the socioeconomic disenfranchisement of the largely Shi’a south. Much of the direct conflict 
between the PLO and Israel occurred in this border region, leaving these populations vulnerable 
in a country that was already crumbling around them. With the 1982 invasion and occupation, 
Israel became directly involved in the rise of Shi’a political movements and violent resistance, a 
new social reality that would greatly impact the construction of politics and civic activity in the 
postwar state. 
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Iran Takes Over the Shi’a Movement 
The ongoing conditions of conflict and social marginalization within the Shi’a community 
created a space for the rise of charismatic populist leaders. A wave of Shi’a political-intellectual 
movements began with Musa al-Sadr’s “Movement of the Deprived” (harakat al-mahrumin) in 
1974,15 which consolidated Shi’a activism under a collective cultural identity to form a “coherent 
political force.”16 The Movement of the Deprived pursued a two-fold mission: to advocate on 
behalf of the largely Shi’a South and to provide social services directly to these populations.17 Al-
Sadr also introduced the Shi’a militia Amal, which “eventually evolved into the main political 
party of this ‘crushed but awakened community’ as a whole.”18 It is the formation of the unified 
Shi’a front that would ultimately shape the role of this community in the sociopolitical structures 
of Lebanon during and after the civil war. 
This political movement connected the Lebanese Shi’a community with a transnational 
Shi’a identity. It opened a space for the outcomes 1979 Islamic revolution and the establishment 
of an Islamic Republic in Iran to penetrate deep into the Lebanese Shi’a political consciousness 
through a precise manipulation – and ultimate usurpation – of al-Sadr’s movement on the part of 
the Ayatollah Khomeini. Certainly, the creation of an Islamic Republic in “one of the world’s 
oldest and most illustrious nation-states”19 can be expected to have significant impact in the Arab 
world at large; however, it was particularly influential within Shi’a-populated areas. 
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This was especially true in Lebanon, where by the 1970s, Shi’a identity was strengthening 
in a nationalism tangential from that of Lebanese citizenship and statehood. By 1982, ideological 
dissonance led to the split of the al-Sadr’s party, with some members forming what would 
ultimately become Hezbollah, the Party of God.20 The rift within the Shi’a political movement 
was a direct consequence of the “exporting” of the Islamic Revolution. Not only were the 
Lebanese Shi’a militias driven by the success of the revolution,21 but this success also allowed Iran 
to enter the fray as a major player in the civil war. Under the pretext of combatting Israel after 
the 1982 invasion, Iranian forces entered the Beqa’a Valley, where they were able to cultivate a 
pro-Iranian, anti-Israeli Shi’a militant faction.22 Iran’s support for a splinter faction led to an 
intrasectarian battle for leadership over Shi’a populations not unlike that which emerged between 
the Christian factions of the LF, with Hezbollah ultimately “[emerging] as the most effective 
and organized military group”23 against the rival Amal. 
With this split within the Shi’a movement, the Lebanese political Shi’a identity ceased to 
be a unified force. While Amal emphasized Lebanese-Arab identity and Arab Shi’ism, 
Hezbollah aligned closely with Iran and a transnational Shi’a identity. 24 Hezbollah’s 1985 
manifesto, “Open Letter to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World,” cites this identity 
specifically: “We are… linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and 
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religious connection of Islam… This is why whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim 
umma of which we are an integral part.”25 It is this transnational Islamic identity that formed the 
foundation for Hezbollah’s twofold mission: the pursuit of a “theoretical”26 Islamic state in 
Lebanon which answered to the authority of the wali al-faqih (the Ayatollah),27 and the 
development of necessary structures to “initiate jihad against Israel.”28 
With the backing of the Ayatollah, Hezbollah became the party of resistance in the 
ongoing conflict with Israel and the antithetical ideology to Zionism.29 As the party coalesced 
around this mission of resistance, “its boldness of vision and clarity of intent proved irresistible to 
large numbers of disaffected Shi'as who had been inspired by the Iranian revolution and 
infuriated by Israeli aggression against Lebanese and Palestinians.”30 The powerful group soon 
developed a “state within a state,”31 not only serving as a militant faction but also developing a 
social infrastructure within its territories.32 In cultivating an alternative to the marginalizing 
political sectarian state (and in fact openly opposing the confessionalist system during this 
period),33 Hezbollah reinforced the factionalized society by engendering a distinct Shi’a 
nationalist identity. 
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Lebanon as a Cold War Proxy 
The outbreak of conflict in 1975 also coincided with a rising interest in the region as a Cold War 
battleground. Players on both sides of the Iron Curtain identified strategic advantages within the 
various militias, and soon joined regional players in attempting to influence the outcome of the 
conflict in their best interests. Because of the international structures already at play, victories of 
certain militias impacted the power and influence of other countries allied with the West or the 
USSR. 
Prior to the 1982 Israeli invasion, aid to the Palestinian resistance presented a strategic 
advantage to the USSR. Support for the PLO and other Palestinian factions “was offered for the 
same reason as military and economic assistance to allied states, most notably Syria and Iraq, 
insofar as Moscow’s objective was to maximize its influence in the region at the West’s 
expense.”34 It is due to the geostrategic importance of the region for players on both sides of the 
Cold War that the USSR supported “opposition to Israel, and by extension the former European 
colonial powers.”35 Israel’s 1982 invasion, then, signaled a strengthening of U.S. power in the 
region. The U.S. and Europe (predominantly France) played their part in the conflict by lending 
support to what they viewed as the more Western-sympathetic factions: Christian militias, most 
notably the Kata'eb.36 The U.S. and its allies also had an interest in specifically deterring Iranian-
backed Hezbollah and proxies of Soviet-allied Syria.  
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 The overarching priority of the United States (and by extension its Western allies) was a 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would ensure both regional stability and strategic 
U.S. influence. Despite attempts on the part of the Americans to assert influence through 
impartial peace negotiations in 1983, they were, as David Hirst argues, “anything but.”37 The 
U.S.-brokered May 17th Accord between Gemayel’s government and Israel “brought satisfaction 
to the Americans, the Israelis, and the Lebanese Forces, but was violently denounced by 
Damascus and its local allies in Lebanon,”38 and the objective of negotiating Arab-Israeli peace 
ultimately stoked intersectarian and regional tensions and escalated the conflict. 
Syrian Alliances of Opportunity 
Syria’s involvement in the civil war was characterized not by the backing of one specific faction, 
but by a fluid procession of allegiances constantly shifting to ensure Damascus maintained 
strategic advantages in the territory. President Hafez al-Assad saw the collapse of Lebanon as a 
crippling blow to Syrian efforts against Israel and a threat to the country’s regional hegemony.39 
Although concerns about the outcome of the 1975 Lebanese Civil War were far from the first 
instance of Syrian interest in Lebanon’s domestic affairs, the country’s manipulation of various 
sectarian forces set the foundation for the “Syrianization” of public spaces in the postwar 
republic. 
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Ultimately, “Syria sought to develop an independent power position from which to 
conduct its regional and international policies in an autonomous fashion” by leveraging 
remaining spheres of influence in Lebanon. In the beginning of the war, Syrian forces supported 
their “traditional proxies”: the PLO and its Muslim-leftist allies.40 This was a continuation of 
Syria’s support of Arab movements as the leading entity in the pan-Arab cause. However, this 
allegiance pivoted soon after, and by 1976, fearing the implications of a Christian defeat in the 
larger Arab-Israeli conflict, Assad had thrown support behind the Christian Lebanese Forces.41 
The shift demonstrated Syria’s primary interest in maintaining a strong regional autonomy and 
influence in the neighboring territory, as Syrian leadership feared that a defeat of Christian forces 
would permanently fracture the territory and lead to the creation of an Israeli-allied Christian 
entity.42 
As its early actions indicated, Syria’s interests in the war were not tied to a singular 
factional mission; rather, they were a means through which Syria could solidify its influence 
across sectarian spheres in Lebanon. Syria’s invasion in 1976 achieved first and foremost a firm 
standing as one of the most influential players in the conflict.43 While Damascus continued to 
oppose the PLO in an effort to prevent the creation of Christian and Muslim mini-states, it did 
not rely solely on Christian militias as a proxy. Israel’s growing military pressure, and ultimately 
the invasion in 1982, necessitated the cultivation of a Syrian-allied buffer in the southern border 
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regions. Thus, Syria cultivated alliances with both Shi’a and Druze factions to push back against 
the Gemayel presidency,44 and Amal (later, Hezbollah) served as a proxy against further PLO 
engagement. 
By the close of the fifteen-year civil war in 1989, Syria had exerted its influence – through 
support, opposition, and oftentimes both – across most of the warring factions. More 
importantly, Damascus effectively solidified Syria’s “special relationship” with Lebanon by 
ensuring Syrian military and political interests were integral to the stability of the postwar 
republic. The civil war thus laid the foundation for pax Syriana in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
legitimizing the presence of Syrian troops and leaving open channels of influence in every aspect 
of public life. 
Women, War and Nationalism: Gendering the Sectarian Conflict 
During the 1975-1989 Civil War, sectarian conflict offered women new opportunities to engage 
in what were perceived as public, male-dominated spaces. Some became involved directly in 
political activity and even combat; during the wave of Christian nationalist activity in the 60s and 
70s, young women were actively engaged in this movement, participating in the Kata'eb party 
and “even joining paramilitary organizations, thereby providing them with a stepping stone into 
combat during the civil war.”45 The outbreak of conflict in 1975 opened other avenues for 
women's participation in the nationalist struggle, including the formation of three all-female 
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Christian militias of “young female soldiers [who] had decided to take up arms to defend their 
community, their way of life, their image of Lebanon as a state.”46 
In the Shi’a communities, particularly in the Israeli-occupied South, women also engaged 
in defensive actions as well as political activity. Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, a leader 
in the Lebanese Shi’a intellectual and political movement, believed that “the Qu’ran states that 
all believers, men and women, should cooperate together in facing conflict and those who 
commit aggression against Islam.”47 However, while women may take up arms if needed, their 
primary role is that of “supporting fighters and producing the next generation.”48 Thus, the role 
of motherhood became a woman’s sacred duty, especially within societies deeply affected by 
conflict in which coping with the realities of conflict transcended the personal and the familial 
and became integrated in the structure of public life. 
Women in particular experienced this fusion of the “public” and “private” in their 
interactions within what could be considered the wartime civic space. The social position of 
women came to occupy a precarious space in public/private life, as “the elevation of the role of 
motherhood to the realm of sanctity [seemed] to capture women within the domain of the 
domestic and thus patriarchy … yet, it is the same emphasis on her role as mother that allows her 
flexibility outside the realm of the domestic.”49 Thus, women integrated into their societies 
without becoming active participants. Even when deviating from peaceful roles, they embodied 
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the larger struggles of their society as the maternal entity not only to affected individuals, but also 
to this conflict society at large. 
The example of Shi’a women demonstrates an important point: that in a society in which 
all aspects of life have been politicized and even militarized, non-combative roles were also 
political and played an active role in the civic realm. During the war, and in the postwar period, 
women played a role in peace activism50 as well as the provision of social services within their 
own communities. In this way, women engaged in sectarian struggles and formed new civic 
spaces. However, these spaces were volatile and could not remain as the sectarian sociopolitical 
structures stabilized in the postwar state of the 1990s. 
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V. CASE STUDY: GENDER AND CIVIC SPACE IN MODERN 
LEBANON 
The social structures and political turmoil in Lebanon today can be traced directly to the 20th 
century transformations outlined in previous chapters. French and Ottoman statecraft cultivated 
a sectarian political elite within the multiconfessional society which was dominated by a 
Maronite hegemony, despite the relative demographic minority of the Maronites in the new 
territory of “Greater Lebanon.” This facilitated the development of factionalized political spheres 
divided between 18 officially-recognized sectarian identities. Ultimately, the consociational 
power-sharing system enshrined in the 1943 National Pact proved too weak to withstand 
competing pressures from both domestic and international actors, and the country collapsed into 
15 years of civil war from 1985-1989. 
Civic spaces and engagement with Lebanese citizenship found no fresh beginnings 
during the post-Civil War reconstruction – rather, the precarious interplay of relationships to 
identity and state molded to the continued proliferation of political sectarianism and 
manipulation by external actors and the sectarian elite. The postwar reconstruction and the 
political system of the 21st century were built on the same fragile foundation as the power-
sharing agreements of the Ottoman, Mandate, and post-independence periods. The sectarian 
social, political and legal structures further integrated gendered notions of citizenship and 
identity in the modern Lebanese state. 
The post-civil war period of the 1990s also saw the proliferation of voluntary 
organizations and NGOs to “fill in” for the state in both social services provision and rights-
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based advocacy.1 However, these organizations further served to reinforce sectarian power 
structures by serving specific sectarian groups. Rather than unify the Lebanese state within one 
collective postwar society, the provision of social services by civilian organizations (rather than 
the state) ensured that confessional divides dictated social hierarchies. Further, the strong Syrian 
presence in postwar Lebanon severely restricted the freedoms of civil society. Even with the 
removal of this factor, Lebanese political and civil society remained fractured according to 
sectarian allegiances.  
The extent to which the pax Syriana shaped (or hindered) the sociopolitical evolution of 
the postwar state is not fully understood; however, it is evident that Syria, much like France, 
Israel, Iran, and the other states in Lebanon’s history of occupation and foreign patronage, 
significantly impacted the Lebanese political system. The social policies and political structures 
implemented over the course of Lebanon’s recent history allowed for sectarian divides to extend 
beyond cultural groups or even militant factions. Today, Lebanon’s sociopolitical structure 
reflects just how deeply entrenched the state has become in sectarian modes of identity, law, and 
politics. In studying the development of this state, the legacies of colonialism and civil war 
become evident, offering a means by which to measure and study civic spaces. It is within these 
spaces that gendered barriers to political life are erected, both explicitly and implicitly, as a result 
of political sectarian structures that reinforce patriarchal norms of civic life. 
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Reconstructing Sectarianism in the Postwar State 
The 1989 Taif Agreement 
After fifteen years of brutal civil war which resulted in an estimated 150,000 fatalities, hundreds 
of thousands of displaced persons,2 and the disrupted livelihood of an entire country, the return 
to a precarious sectarian balance was negotiated between factional leaders and external parties. It 
did not, however, reduce the role of sectarianism in public life. The Taif Agreement restructured 
the Lebanese confessional system only insofar as it amended the existing power-sharing 
agreements to dilute the political power of the Maronite president and redistribute this power to 
at least partially reflect the country’s demographic realities.3  
By the late 1980s, it became increasingly evident there would be no clear victor in the 
war, and by 1989, “the Lebanese Civil War came to an end… at a time when movement toward 
internal reconciliation coincided with favorable regional and international developments.”4 In 
other words, the realization of a peaceful settlement was driven largely by the shifts in global 
power brought about by the conclusion of the Cold War: in addition to the war-weary Lebanese 
citizens, many of the militias’ international patrons were eager to see a settlement reached. Thus, 
much as these external actors played an instrumental role in fueling the intersectarian conflicts, 
so would they also come to dictate the peace settlement which would bring an end to the large-
scale violence. 
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The Taif Agreement was negotiated in 1989 between the sectarian elite who comprised 
what remained of the pre-war parliament, with significant input from the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, and Syria. It was only through the establishment of a new sectarian power-sharing 
agreement, regarded as a “necessary but temporary evil”5 which would be cycled out of the 
political structure6 at some unspecified point in the future, that an agreement could be reached. 
Thus, sectarian violence was to be quelled by reinforcing sectarian systems of governance under 
the auspices of international players. 
The formal text of the agreement began by establishing Lebanon as “a final homeland for 
all its citizens,” and affirming that “Lebanon’s soil belongs to all Lebanese.”7 However, sectarian 
provisions were woven into many fundamental details of what was to become the politics and 
governance of the postwar state. The Taif Agreement brought about what was arguably the most 
significant shift in the Lebanese sociopolitical system since the formation of Greater Lebanon – 
and it was to the disadvantage of the Christian sects, most notably the Maronites. Indeed, the 
agreement “achieved what all previous peace initiatives and proposals to end the Lebanese 
conflict failed to achieve: the abolition of the Maronites' constitutional predominance.”8  
Thus, the consociational power-sharing model of the 1926 Constitution and the 1943 
National Pact, developed at a time when Maronite elites held enough political capital to 
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maintain dominance, was rearranged to reflect the demographic realities of the postwar republic. 
The office of the President became more symbolic than political,9 and the powers of that office 
were conferred onto the Council of Ministers and the Parliament.10 The proportional six-to-five 
ratio of representation was also discarded in favor of equal representation between Muslims and 
Christians.11 By restructuring the balance of factionalized power, sectarian civic spaces also 
shifted to accommodate this change. 
The devastation of the 1975 war had consequences for “Christian Lebanon” beyond the 
more evident political aftermath. Although the early stages of the war were sparked by 
nationalist essentialism and defense against “a mortal threat to the state of Lebanon, and to its 
Christian citizens in particular,”12 the fifteen years of conflict ultimately left the position of the 
Lebanese Christian population more fragile than ever. As Faour notes, Maronites were more 
likely to emigrate due to their socioeconomic advantages,13 and in fact many were among the 
estimated one million Lebanese who emigrated to escape the conflict.14  Although there is no 
official data on population shifts during the Lebanese Civil War, it is estimated that the 
Maronite population was significantly reduced in this time. Thus, the Maronite claim to 
demographic dominance was even further weakened as Lebanon transitioned into the postwar 
period of the early 1990s. 
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The Shi’a, on the other hand, came to possess significant political capital and influence, 
particularly in areas with heavy Shi’a populations including South Lebanon and the southern 
suburbs of Beirut. The new power-sharing agreement enshrined in the 1989 Taif Accord 
reflected this shift in sectarian influences, stripping powers from the Maronite-held office of 
President and strengthening the political influence of the Shi’a Speaker of Parliament. Further, 
Hezbollah, as the primary resistance to Israel, was the only militia not required to disarm 
following the peace agreement.15 Later, despite the party’s objections to the perpetuation of 
political sectarianism in the postwar state, they participated in the 1992 parliamentary elections. 
This was the first move toward the “Lebanization” of the party – integrating into the Lebanese 
national identity rather than isolating its Shi’a identity.16 Their intrasectarian rival, the Amal 
movement, also took a position in the country’s new political structure. With the entrance of 
both these factions into Lebanese political life, the Shi'a identity became politicized and 
integrated within the political sectarian framework of the Lebanese state. 
Pax Syriana and Politics of the Early Postwar System 
Internal	Restructuring	of	the	Sect-Based	Society	
The Taif Agreement may have brought an end to extensive factional violence, but it did not 
smooth sectarian inequalities. Although the events of the post-independence era and the 1975-
89 civil war shaped a firm Shi’a political presence in Lebanon, they did not eliminate the social 
rifts between the different sects. Rather, they solidified the sectarian populism that defined the 
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country’s politics. Indeed, unlike the other prominent sectarian groups, the Shi’a entered the 
postwar era with “growing organizational and political power” tied both to “emerging communal 
strength” within the Lebanese system and the “growing regional influence of Iran,”17 the 
international patron of political Shi’ism. Meanwhile, “the Maronites [became] more inward-
looking, and ... emigrated in increasing numbers.”18 Thus, the overall lack of confidence in the 
new sociopolitical structure of the Lebanese state weakened Christian ethnonationalist power 
and influence in Lebanese politics and society. This can be seen in the transition from a 
Christian-Muslim to Sunni-Shi'a split in the country19: while sectarianism continues to dictate 
sociopolitical structures, the identity struggle is no longer a question of Lebanese essentialism 
versus pan-Arab nationalism. The public sphere, therefore, came to be shaped by both the 
“Arabization” of the country under the Syrian-controlled government as well as the 
fragmentation of the Christian political leadership and identity.20  
Syrian	Influence	in	Postwar	Politics	and	Society	
In addition to internal restructuring, the Taif Agreement allowed for the introduction of an 
amnesty law through which sectarian militias and their leaders could not be prosecuted for 
actions during the war, a move that facilitated what Annia Ciezadlo calls the postwar “orgy of 
forgetting”21 which plagues Lebanese society, politics and civic life even today. It also formalized 
the “special relationship” between Lebanon and Syria “in a manner that accomplishes the two 
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fraternal countries' interests within the sovereignty and independence of each of them.”22 
Although the agreement called for the gradual removal of existing Syrian troops, Syrian influence 
in the country only strengthened in peacetime. 
The insertion of Syrian interests into the formation of the postwar state played a 
significant role in the replication of a sectarian state. During pax Syriana, Damascus controlled 
virtually every aspect of Lebanese public life.23 In the political realm, it cultivated a class of 
sectarian political elite sympathetic to Syrian interests in the country. The post-civil war political 
structure determined the allocation of power among the major Sunni, Shi’a and Maronite sects 
“based on a competition to gain the support of Damascus,”24 drastically reducing popular support 
for the elected bodies of the new government.25 In the development of a postwar civil society, pax 
Syriana restricted the proliferation of associations and politically oriented actors by suppressing 
opposition to Syrian rule,26 and “civil society organizations were penetrated, pulverized, and 
consequently succumbed to the control of Syria's local agents.”27 
The	Cedar	Revolution	and	the	Rise	of	the	March	Alliances	
While Syrian intervention in Lebanon shaped the political system to align with Syrian interests, 
it also agitated civic spaces, opening a space for collective opposition to Syrian military presence. 
As the military protection became less and less relevant in the eyes of the Lebanese populace and 
the international community, dissent was able to chip away at Syria’s claims to legitimacy. 
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Ultimately, this dissent erupted into the public space with the 2005 Cedar Revolution, which 
marked a turning point in Lebanese political and civic life. The assassination of the anti-Syria 
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri mobilized “an eclectic multigenerational, multiconfessional, 
and multiclass mix of activists linked to both civil and political society”28 to demand an end to 
Syrian involvement in Lebanon, both militarily and politically. The Sunni Future Movement, in 
alliance with Druze and Christian political parties, turned out masses of young people to gather 
in Martyr’s Square to call for the removal of the pro-Syrian regime.29 Counter-protests led by 
Hezbollah opposed the withdrawal of Syria. 
While many demands of the revolution were met, the movement did not bring about a 
wave of secular politics. Kingston argues that “it would be a mistake … to ignore the deep-rooted 
sectarian political dynamics at work before, during and after the March 14 demonstrations.”30 
Rather than unify society under one secular national identity, the revolution exacerbated 
sectarian divides. This was evident in the polarization between the Future Movement and 
Hezbollah, “reflective of the sharp divisions along increasingly sectarian lines and incompatible 
visions of Lebanon’s past, present and future.”31 This altered political landscape also gave rise to 
new sectarian populist movements, namely the Christian movement under Michel Aoun and the 
Sunni Muslim movement under Saad Al-Din Al-Hariri.32  
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The sectarian upheavals incited by the Cedar Revolution coalesced into two opposing 
coalitions: the March 14 Alliance, led by Saad Al-Din Al-Hariri’s Future Movement; and the 
March 8 Alliance, led by the Shi’a parties Amal and Hezbollah, and Aoun’s Free Patriotic 
Movement.33 Thus, rather than transcending sectarian allegiances and achieving any form of 
secular Lebanese nationality, the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon only further paralyzed the 
country’s political system in a sectarian stalemate. 
Sectarianism and Secularism in the Post-Syria National Identity 
The structures of governance implemented as temporary measures in the amended constitution 
remain in Lebanese politics today, and the sectarian divides formalized by the National Pact 
continue to dictate political representation as well as legal regimes. As per the Taif Agreement, 
the legislative body (Chamber of Deputies) is split evenly between Christians and Muslims, with 
the position of Speaker of Parliament held by a Shi’a Muslim.34 The new power-sharing 
agreement has become difficult to shake, as partisan interests hinder possibilities of intersectarian 
concessions.  
If Lebanon were to implement a fully proportional electoral system, Christians would 
have the most to lose. Muslim communities, particularly the Shi’a, would gain significant 
political leverage over the Christian minority if sectarian quotas were abolished. The fear of this 
outcome can be seen not only in the actions of political leaders, but also in the political views of 
Maronite citizens, the majority of whom support confessionalism.35 Even in post-Syria Lebanon, 
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“Christians continue to view themselves as the targets of malevolent forces of Syrianization.”36 A 
study published in 2012 found that, among the three major sects in Lebanon, Maronites had the 
strongest orientation to sectarian communalism: 70% of Maronites held society rather than their 
own sect responsible for socioeconomic problems (compared to 44% of Sunnis and 55% of 
Shiites).37 The decline of Christian preeminence, both demographically and politically, have 
made Christian leaders particularly aware of the need to maintain influence in Lebanese politics 
and society, and to “strengthen Lebanon's Christian minority in the face of rising tensions 
between the Middle East's two dominant forces, [Iran and Saudi Arabia].”38 
Law, Gender and Civic Spaces in 21st-Century Lebanon 
Colonial Legacies in Legal Code 
Legal	Frameworks	for	Civil	Society	
Much of the legal precedent for civil society is based on laws implemented before Lebanon was 
an independent state. This not only creates barriers for civil society actors, but also ties civic 
engagement and civic space to the underlying interests of the colonial actors and factional elite of 
nearly a century ago. Lebanese associational life continues to be dictated by the Law of 
Associations established by the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century,39 which defines an 
association as “a group of several persons permanently unifying their knowledge or efforts for 
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nonprofit objectives.”40 Under this law, all associations must be registered with the state before 
being permitted to conduct activities.  
At face value, the Law of Associations protects all civil organizations within the Lebanese 
state. In practice, however, there are many ways in which this legal arrangement can be leveraged 
against particular civil society organizations. While registration laws do provide a unified system 
through which to examine associational activities, they also restrict such a study by making 
unregistered organizations, or groups that do not qualify to be registered, virtually inaccessible.41 
There are several opportunities through which “sectarian elites [can] use both formal and 
informal means to infiltrate what can be considered relatively minor civil society organizations.”42 
In addition to the Ottoman Law of Associations, the 1926 Lebanese Constitution 
establishes a broader set of rights norms for civil society. Most notable is Article 13, which states 
that “the freedom to express one's own opinion orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the 
freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association are guaranteed within the limits established 
by law.”43 The preamble of the 1990 amended constitution also recognizes Lebanon's adherence 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.44 By integrating these acknowledgements into 
one of the country’s fundamental legal documents, Lebanon has, in theory, integrated free 
association and the foundation of a vibrant civil society into the legal framework of the country. 
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However, the establishment of any overarching national legal norm is precluded by the divisive 
nature of political sectarianism. 
Sectarian	Legal	Structures	
The sectarian frameworks of Lebanese society do not end at political structures or even aspects of 
what can be considered “public life.” Political sectarianism is deeply entrenched in both Lebanese 
nationhood and citizenship, thus providing the parameters of corresponding civic spaces. Indeed, 
the sectarian legal system itself “is the vehicle through which society denotes not only its 
regulations, but also its actual values and behavioral patterns, as well as what is considered to be 
natural or unnatural.”45 What results is a fragmented relationship between the state and its 
citizens, in which the rights and experiences of citizenship vary based on state-established 
identity. Consequently, this leads to the fragmentation of civic spaces among – and quite possibly 
within – the various sects. 
An example of divided citizenship which is of particular importance to this study is the 
Personal Status Code. Rather than one secular personal status law, this aspect of civil law falls 
under the jurisdiction of fifteen individual sectarian civil courts that “determine, regulate and 
legislate blood-based kinship regimes in Lebanon.”46 These courts rule on all issues of marriage, 
parentage, and domestic disputes, among other legal issues considered part of “family law.” The 
jurisdictions of these courts effectively drive sectarian cleavages beyond the “public” realm and 
into “private” life by dictating the legal structures of domestic life according to a person's 
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officially-recognized sect. In practice, this means that religious law can determine matters of 
personal status whether or not it coincides with an individual's religious identity or values. 
Gendered Barriers to Civic Life 
The legal status of women in Lebanon directly affects their relationship with public life, 
disassociating women’s groups from the political realm.47 As one woman activist observed, 
“sectarianism is a taboo topic to discuss, plus… feminism is not political in their [women’s 
groups’] eyes.”48 Further, political life is considered to be a component of the male-dominated 
public sphere and contains inherent structures of patriarchy. 49 Thus, the perceptions of the 
“public” and the “private” directly impact the roles and activities of Lebanese citizens. By 
polarizing the two, the “private” is removed from the “public” realm,50 despite the politicization 
of sectarian identity through personal status laws; that is, the intermingling of the “public” and 
“private” in the civic realm. 
It should be noted that, in Lebanon, women are not necessarily underrepresented as a 
whole in civil society organizations. In the CIVICUS consultations for the 2006 Civil Society 
Index, “the diversity of participants was not highlighted as a significant problem… of the 
respondents to the regional stakeholder consultations, 91% were satisfied with the representation 
of women.”51 However, this report also noted that, with the exception of women’s groups, men 
dominated leadership positions in civil society organizations.52 Women’s participation in public 
life, whether through civic engagement or direct participation in the political system, is dictated 
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by a complex relationship with legal frameworks and social norms. This engagement in civil 
society and civic life does not exist independently of the sectarian backdrop of the Lebanese 
system. Rather, this aspect of Lebanese society exists as an extension of intersectarian 
sociopolitical relationships. Issues of interest to women in Lebanese civil society, from gender 
equality to social services and philanthropy, are approached from varying lenses of sectarian 
identities. Groups that are multisectarian in nature often reflect the broader power relations of 
the state.  
The most prominent example of such an arrangement can be found in the Lebanese 
Council of Women (LCW), which the authors of The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon 
argue has “allowed” itself to be “appropriated by the sectarian/political elite.”53 The leadership of 
the LCW is structured similarly to the power-sharing model of the state itself, and the internal 
politics of the organization have consistently reflected the political climate in the society at 
large.54 This organization demonstrates the ways in which the precarious sociopolitical position 
of Lebanese women prevents a truly unified mobilization within civic spaces. 
The	Legal	Status	of	Women	
As Khatib notes, “although Lebanese law does not discriminate against women regarding 
political participation and voting, women's involvement in politics in Lebanon is marginalized”55 
due to inherently discriminatory institutions. This marginalization manifests in both law and 
culture, as sociopolitical structures confine women’s participation in public life within 
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frameworks unique to their position among the sectarian factionalization of law and politics. 
Even within secular legal structures, the legal status of women remains ambiguous at best, and 
often times more explicitly distinguished from that of the male citizens of the Lebanese state. 
Women’s marginalization is present even at the core of the country’s legal structure in the 
1926 Lebanese constitution and its post-Taif amendments. At face value this document implies 
equality in status between men and women. For example, Article 7 states: “All Lebanese should 
be equal before the law. They shall equally enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be 
bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction,”56 and Article 12 ensures that 
“every Lebanese shall have the right to hold public office, no preference shall be made on the 
basis of merit and competence.”57 However, in using gender-neutral terminology and not 
explicitly prohibiting gender discrimination, the Lebanese constitution effectively 
institutionalizes gender disparity in political and public life.58 
More overtly affecting women’s relationship with the state is personal status law. Khatib 
notes that this fragmented, sect-based structure causes women of different confessional identities 
to have different experiences of family and citizenship.59 Mikdashi further points out that a 
woman’s registered sectarian association (and thus personal status) does not always accurately 
represent her personal identity, religious beliefs or political orientation.60 This creates a complex 
relationship between perceived private and public spheres, particularly when personal and 
sectarian identities do not directly coincide. 
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Personal status laws often represent the sociopolitical orientations and objectives of the 
sects themselves, as they are a means by which private life can be dictated by religious authorities. 
Thus, gendered participation in sectarian communities is not limited to social perceptions; the 
values and ideologies that facilitate this participation are reflected in religious law. Each of the 
three major sects adhere to the personal status laws of three separate schools. Maronite religious 
law is dictated by the Maronite church which – much like Christian society itself – did not 
emerge unaffected from the war and the subsequent fall in Maronite power. Indeed, “there 
emerged a strong sense of disillusionment within Lebanon's Maronite communities that was 
mirrored by that within the church itself,”61 adding to the uncertain nature of the Maronite's 
position in the postwar state. This was met with an effort by the Vatican to “rejuvenate and 
‘purify’ the church as a way of preserving its strong presence in the country and in the region.”62 
Thus, religious law in Maronite tradition has been tied directly to the survival of Maronite 
nationhood. 
The religious courts that dictate Shi'a personal status law follow the Ja'fari school,63 a 
legal tradition specific to Shi'a jurisprudence.64 Like many religious legal traditions, the Ja'fari 
school integrates religious teachings and a complex history of religious scholarship, which this 
study unfortunately does not have the space to thoroughly explore. What is important to note for 
the context of sectarian legal structures, is that the Ja'fari courts dictate the personal status laws of 
Shi'a Muslims only - citizens identified as Sunni Muslim adhere to the legal authority of a 
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separate religious court. Thus, the disengagement of the Shi'a community from other groups is 
not only social or cultural, but enshrined in legal tradition as well. 
As a consequence of this divide, Lebanese women navigate legal structures unique to 
their sectarian identity. For example, “in Lebanon certain Christian and Jewish personal status 
laws are much more stringent in their production and regulation of normative gender roles than 
codified Islamic personal status laws.”65 Further, while Sunni legal codes do not permit women to 
inherit, Shi’a courts dictate that a woman’s inheritance can equal “as much as half as much as 
their brothers”66 – further reflecting the familial structure of Shi’a society and establishing 
financial obligation as a male role.67  
Relationships with the state are also gendered within the system of citizenship and 
residency regimes – an area of law which falls under the secular civil code, rather than the 
jurisdiction of religious courts. According to citizenship laws, a woman cannot pass on her 
citizenship to her children or to a non-Lebanese spouse.68 Further, women do not retain their 
residency (registered birthplace) upon marriage – they assume the residency of their spouse. 
Because of this, women are prevented from interacting independently with the state, their 
relationship to civic life instead characterized by their marital (and by extension, domestic) 
relationship. 
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Gender	and	Sectarian	Political	Orientations	
Because sectarian identity continues to dictate Lebanese politics and society, nationalist projects 
remain predominant within sectarian spaces. The Lebanese identity is rooted in collective 
nationalisms, and citizens interact with the state through the lens of sectarian nationalist and/or 
populist identity. Thus, women continue to navigate civic spaces within the framework of these 
orientations. 
This can be seen among women’s civic engagement within individual sectarian structures. 
Such activity is largely reflective of the civic consciousness of the sectarian community as a whole, 
which serves to uphold nationalist ideals and sectarian power. For example, Kingston notes that 
“while women within the Shi’a communities of Lebanon have clearly been entering the public 
sphere in unprecedented numbers… the contours of that public sphere and the role of women 
within it continue to be defined by Shi’a communal political projects.”69 Movements such as 
transnational Shi’a Islamism offer a means of entry to civic spaces within existing sectarian 
frameworks. Indeed, women represent a “key constituency” in Islamist populism, as they 
“perform the grassroots daily functions that have built and sustained” these movements.70 
Such is the case with women’s participation in Hezbollah. The Women’s Association of 
Hezbollah (WAH) plays an important role in the promotion and implementation of the party’s 
vision for the Lebanese state. At the same time, they promote the view of gender roles within the 
Shi’a society as parallel and complementary. Zaatari observed that WAH women “believed in 
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equality between men and women but not in the 'Western' sense of sameness.”71 Rather, they 
emphasized “motherly qualities” and familial duties.72 In this sense, women within this Shi'a 
Islamist movement reproduce sectarian modes of patriarchy within their own sociopolitical 
context. 
However, participation in the party also offers a means by which women can more 
actively participate in civic life.73 It establishes a channel through which women can interact with 
and influence their own political-sectarian identities. As Baylouny notes, “the notion of ‘the 
political’ itself must be enlarged. Much transformation occurs through both the dynamics of 
everyday life and member involvement in movement institutions that are not geared to formal 
politics.”74 Through involvement with Hezbollah and Shi’a Islamism, women have taken on the 
task of defining their own identity and agency in “an authentic expression of empowerment, a 
way of shaking off Western-style modernization.”75  
Similarly, Christian women navigate public spaces through a lens of Lebanese Christian 
nationalism. This includes not only ethnonationalist claims to the territory itself, but also an 
engagement with the position of Christians in post-Taif Lebanon. After the conflict ended with 
the Taif Agreement, the role of women in the Christian nationalist project evolved from direct 
engagement in the sectarian conflict to a more traditional, “feminized” role. Women are 
engaging in the new battle the Christians face: the struggle to maintain influence in the postwar 
Lebanese system and to overturn the population crisis of the minority sect. In this project, 
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focused on encouraging intra-sect marriage and discouraging emigration, women have been 
tasked with strengthening the Christian nation through marriage and parenthood. In the 21st 
century, “the perceived threat of a declining birth rate and an aging population has made 
marriage and childbirth a question of survival for young Lebanese [Christians] who are 
concerned for the continued existence of their specific family and religious groups and for the 
future of the nation as a whole.”76 Thus, women have been integrated into the nationalist project 
through their domestic roles, politicizing what is traditionally considered the "feminine" private 
sphere.  
Although nationalism appears to offer a plausible entryway to civic spaces for women, it 
is not a permanent solution. The inherent “nation-first” ideologies that drive nationalist 
movements do not leave a space for divergent feminist discourse. Participants in the nationalist 
project integrate any ideologies beyond the nationalist narrative (such as gender equality in 
society as a whole) into the central collectivist mission. Ellen Fleischmann notes that this was an 
obstacle to the formation of a “feminist consciousness” among women's movements in the 
colonized Middle East, and that “the question of gender inequity invariably was postponed or 
considered divisive, and the national issue seen as the priority.”77 Nationalism, therefore, does not 
serve as a foundation for expanded participation in public life, but rather restricts the means and 
purposes of this participation to that which best serves the nationalist agenda. 
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Social	Structures	and	Sectarian	Identities	
Beyond the limiting factors of nationalist projects, women face constraints within the social 
structures of sectarian communities. The political and cultural orientations of different sects 
construct frameworks of patriarchy that restrict women from full participation in public life. 
While it is tempting to pursue the question of “who is the most liberated?”, this suggests a 
hierarchy of sect-based oppression. Such an examination of social structures does not fully realize 
the existence of social, economic, and political marginalization of women in even the most 
“liberal” of sectarian structures.  
Consider the example of Christian women, who are generally regarded to be more 
“liberated” and “Westernized” than their Muslim counterparts, yet are subjected to the same 
sectarian social and legal structures as women of other religious groups and must navigate their 
own sectarianized structures of patriarchy. As Rustum Shehadeh has noted, Lebanese Christian 
legal and social structures have not developed in a vacuum; they are the result of both sectarian 
ideologies and the influences of their position in a multiconfessional society.78  
Marriage remains “a deeply rooted social value”79 in many Christian societies. Thomas 
notes that, particularly in rural Lebanon, "marriage is a significant means of integration into the 
community, which is why mothers have always sought out suitors for their daughters."80 
Women's communal identity is therefore based significantly on marital status, or their 
participation in “a contract between two unequal partners.”81 Because of the importance placed 
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on this contract, the participation of women in Maronite public spaces is influenced by this social 
indicator. 
Within Shi’a communities, the period of political mobilization has been – and continues 
to be – accompanied by a movement to rethink the role of women and gender within the context 
of Islamic laws and values. Both al-Sadr and Fadlallah, the foremost leaders in the Shi’a political 
and intellectual movement of the civil war and postwar periods, followed a “tradition of 
progressive thinking”82 in regards to the role and position of women in society. Thus, as Shi’a 
populism redefined the role of this community in the Lebanese political project, women were 
encouraged to play a more active and role by working outside the home and pursuing an 
education and itjihad83 (independent reasoning). This tradition of revisiting the role of women 
from within an Islamic framework has “served to break the monopolizing hegemony of the 
discourse of the pre–civil war Shi’a religious establishment on issues relating to gender relations 
within Lebanon’s Shi’a communities.”84 
Shi’a women enjoy a certain level of social equity and play a relatively active role in public 
life, but in doing so they must nevertheless navigate a social and institutional framework of 
patriarchy. Not unlike their Christian counterparts, the social role of women in the Shi’a 
community is centered around familial duties, despite their increasing participation in politics, 
education, and the workforce. One educated woman interviewed by Marie-Claude Thomas 
“shared that her goal is to capture and embrace this time, without forgetting that family is the 
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basis of society and that her role as a mother is to form a family that is full of knowledge and 
awareness, which in turn contributes to a righteous society.”85 Within this structure, a woman 
navigates society and civic life as an extension of the domestic or “private” sphere. Her education, 
professional life and civic participation ultimately reinforce her primary role as the caretaker of 
her family, and by extension, her society. 
Gender, Confessional Identity, and the Failure of the Sectarian State 
Political Rifts and Regional Instability 
Forty years after the outbreak of Lebanon’s fifteen-year civil war, the political conditions in the 
country and the instability of surrounding states are not unlike the conditions that precluded the 
outbreak of conflict in 1975.86 Political power structures are little more than modern iterations of 
the governance of the sectarian political elite established in the 20th century, leaving the national 
government fragile and static. Regional instability and the inflow of refugees is exacerbating the 
sectarian social tensions carried over into the postwar period of the 21st century. Powerful 
international actors are invested in Lebanese domestic affairs, whether it be election results or 
militant activity.  
The fragility of the Lebanese state and the failure of the modern political sectarian system 
disproportionately affects marginalized populations, including women, and corresponding civil 
society activities. Because social and legal structures bar them from full participation in the 
political system, they cannot play an active role in the restructuring and mending of this system. 
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As political uncertainty continues, civic spaces do not necessarily grow when restricted to the 
existing frameworks of participation. 
Historical	Legacies	in	Modern	Political	Sectarianism	
The Cedar Revolution in 2005 succeeded in pushing Syrian troops from the country, but 
otherwise accomplished little overhaul in the political structures established as early as the 
Mandate period. The cultivation of a sectarian elite employed by the French can be seen even 
today, as the same leaders and family names continue to appear on what is quickly becoming a 
stale political stage. Further, the power structures erected during the fifteen-year civil war 
continue to drive domestic affairs, as many of the political parties today were once sectarian 
militias led by the men who now lead political affairs.  
Still fractured along decades-old factional lines, the failures of the modern Lebanese 
government demonstrate “that sectarian politics carries within it the seeds of political paralysis.”87 
Yet these seeds are not necessarily a direct result of intercommunal tensions among citizens; 
much of the stalemate is rooted in established power structures driven by sectarian populisms. 
Indeed, “Lebanon's leaders have become expert in workarounds and postponing things. Officials' 
terms are extended or elections postponed when no one can agree on a replacement or a new 
electoral law.”88 Since its election in 2009, the current Lebanese parliament has twice extended 
its mandate, with the current extension expiring in 2017. The memory of the civil war can be 
found in the paralyzing fear of provoking any form of unrest that might destroy the delicate 
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sectarian balance renegotiated in 1989. Even with the extension, the parliament has been unable 
to elect a president for over a year. To date, there have been 36 votes held for this position.  
Lebanon,	International	Forces	and	Regional	Conflict	
Although Lebanese territory is no longer occupied directly by foreign militaries, external actors 
and events continue to influence its domestic affairs. The strategic importance of Lebanon to 
regional and international players has become increasingly evident as crises of instability unfold 
in the surrounding states. The Syrian crisis, ongoing conflict with Israel, and the tumultuous 
social and political transformations inundating the post–Arab Spring Middle East have caused 
concern both domestically and internationally for Lebanon’s position as a relatively stable 
country in the region. 
Lebanon and Syria have become inextricably intertwined politically, socially and 
culturally. The mutual pan-Arab identities of the early 20th century, political patronage of the 
post-independence period, and military occupation during the final decades of the century have 
linked both the political development and stability of these neighboring states. As conflict and 
instability in Syria continues, sectarianism becomes more prevalent as “sectarian tensions are no 
longer restricted to Lebanon, and the Syrians can no longer assume that they are free from 
sectarianism.”89 Across the border, the massive flow of refugees is triggering a new shift in the 
demographic balance of Lebanese sectarianism as large numbers of Sunni Muslims are added to 
                                               
89 Saada Oulwa, “Lebanon-Syria Border Towns Ravaged by Sectarianism,” Al-Monitor, October 31, 2012. 
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the population.90 Further entangling Lebanese domestic affairs with the fate of Syria is 
Hezbollah’s alliance with the Asad regime and direct involvement in the conflict. The intricate 
web of alliances and political interests – sectarian or otherwise – ensure that “the longer that 
Syria continues to be in this violent uprising, Lebanon will become more destabilized, and every 
single group in Lebanon may get involved in what is happening in Syria.”91  
Gendered	Citizenship	in	a	Post-Sectarian	State?	
In 2011, demonstrators across the country came out to call for the end of political sectarianism in 
Lebanon. Unlike the sectarian protests of the Cedar Revolution, “men and women from all age 
groups, areas and socio-economic strata march together through parts of Southern Beirut, East 
Beirut, West Beirut and the rest of the country shouting slogans such as ‘we want the end of 
political sectarianism.’”92 These demonstrations represented a break from institutional 
sectarianism at the grassroots level. While ultimately unsuccessful, they highlighted the ongoing 
divergences in public opinion incited by enduring consociational power structures of the state.  
Amid regional turmoil and a shaky domestic government, political sectarianism is 
becoming ever more difficult to maintain. Indeed, recent changes “[necessitate] that the 
Lebanese rethink their future, seriously involve civil society, secular forces and women – all 
practically marginalized now – and redefine Lebanon as a state, not a framework for sectarian 
pluralism.”93 Whether a move to secularism would remove or even decrease gendered barriers to 
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public life and civic spaces, however, is not clear. As Mikdashi has argued, “secular states are just 
as good at engaging in gender oppression and discrimination as any religious movement.”94 
Women in a Fragile Lebanon 
As the country itself faces an existential crisis, women continue to face social marginalization and 
discrimination in the legal and political realm. A 2015 report by Human Rights Watch found 
that women remain disproportionately disadvantaged by the sectarian legal structures, 
particularly due to the personal status laws. According to the report, “the multiplicity of laws 
means that Lebanese citizens are treated differently when it comes to key aspects of their lives, 
including marriage, divorce, and custody of children,”95 a legal discrepancy which most directly 
impacts the social functions perceived as occupying the feminized private space.  
The marginalization perpetuated by disparate personal status laws extends directly into 
women’s participation in public life. In a study of women in managerial positions in Lebanon, 
Hayfaa Tlaiss and Saleema Kauser observed that “although it has been shown that gender 
stereotyping attitudes are changing, the role of women in Arab societies is mainly identified 
within the context of family and the traditions and culture of Arab society.”96 The study found 
that, despite an increase of women in the workplace, less than 5% of managerial positions are 
occupied by women97 and noted that Middle Eastern women are “continually being 
marginalized” from senior positions despite education and experience.98 This disparity is evident 
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in the more specific context of women in politically active life in Lebanon as well. In the 2015 
Inter-Parliamentary Union rankings of women in parliament, Lebanon was ranked at number 
134, with only 3% of lower-house seats held by women – fewer than any other country in the 
Levant region (Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Syria and Iraq).99 
The political realm and spheres of power continue to be occupied largely by men as a 
direct result of the sociopolitical structures perpetuated by the sectarian system. Although 
disproportionate political presence between genders is hardly unique to Lebanon, in this 
particular case it means that women are largely barred from determining the country’s political 
future. This is not to say that women are not taking on active roles in pursuing gender-specific or 
overarching social, political and legal change: women’s organizations in Lebanon are working to 
combat issues such as violence against women and create feminist spaces for future advocacy. 
However, there exists no unified “women’s policy domain within the state,”100 and thus, no 
consolidated means by which women may participate in political reform. 
Overcoming such obstacles and opening spaces for women to take on a more active role 
in political life requires not only a more dominant presence of women in these areas, but also a 
more comprehensive understanding of what it means to participate in civic space. Particularly 
important is to redefine the political: as this study has demonstrated, the “political” and “non-
political” do not always align with the “public” and the “private.” Civil society organizations 
focusing on issues such as social welfare, violence against women, divorce laws, or domestic labor 
rights operate within the same sociopolitical frameworks as those focused on direct political 
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mobilization. It follows that all such associations play a role in establishing the parameters of 
civic, i.e. political, spaces – even if some deal mainly in what is perceived to be the “private 
sphere.” 
Beyond this reconceptualization of political space, more tangible opportunities arise from 
the growth of transnational feminist networks and global platforms for civic engagement. 
Although international collaboration between women’s associations and activists is not a recent 
phenomenon, the development of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) has 
created new platforms for such cooperation. As Youngs notes, “the historically rigid vertical 
structures of the mainstream are now accompanied, thanks to ICTs, by endless horizontal forms 
of communication, putting women directly in touch with one another, whether locally, 
nationally, or globally.”101 Digital platforms, while constantly evolving and still largely unexplored 
for these specific purposes, offer a space detached from state structures where women can 
develop their own civic consciousness.  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Summary of Findings: Gender and Sectarianism in the Lebanese Context 
Understanding the parameters of civic space is an important step in identifying existing and 
potential avenues for civic engagement and political development. In exploring the gendered 
frameworks of political sectarianism in Lebanon, we can better comprehend the complexities of 
these parameters in the Lebanese system. As this study has demonstrated, the sociopolitical 
structures which determine when and by what means women can enter civic spaces are the result 
of a long history of internal power struggles and foreign intervention. 
Lebanon, though a sovereign nation for over 70 years, has never been truly independent. 
The interests and influence of powerful international actors on the sociopolitical structures of 
Lebanon is evident in today’s fragile system of political sectarianism, a delicate balance which 
relies largely on the continued patronage of a variety of these actors. From French colonial 
visions of a “Christian Lebanon,” to Israeli apprehensions of Palestinian retaliation, to Iranian 
manipulation of the Shi’a movement and Syrian usurpation of postwar Lebanese politics, the 
domestic structures of Lebanon are continually rebuilt on the strategic interests of foreign actors. 
The resulting sectarian cleavages permeate not only systems of governance, but also the 
civic consciousness of the Lebanese public. Since sectarianism is so deeply ingrained in Lebanese 
politics and society, it directly impacts citizens’ relationships with the state in both the public and 
private realm. Sociopolitical cleavages are further reproduced by institutionalized sectarian 
structures in politics and law. This can be seen in the personal status laws that politicize what are 
perceived to be “private” spaces. If we are to understand “civic space” as a realm in which the 
perceived “public” and “private” converge, the sectarianization of these spheres ultimately 
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produces experiences of civic life that are not unified but deeply factionalized. Although 
sectarianism is officially regarded as a temporary measure, diverging sect-based legal jurisdictions 
and electoral structures continually cultivate a sectarian elite and ensure that consociational 
power-sharing structures remain a political reality.  
Therefore, it is impossible to discuss women’s engagement with public life without 
acknowledging these underlying dynamics. Because citizenship is both sectarian and gendered, 
women occupy a unique position at the intersection of these spheres. In civic spaces, women 
must reconcile societal norms, sectarian legal structures, and individual identities in order to 
participate in areas of public life. The experiences of women within their unique sectarian 
frameworks and across intersectarian relations reflect the divides and tensions in Lebanese 
politics and society at large. Thus, if society remains factionalized, so too will women’s 
interactions within it, leaving little opportunity for a unified, cross-confessional experience of 
public life. 
However, although sect-specific public spaces vary, there are shared experiences among 
Lebanese women. Though separate, each sectarianized public sphere contains within it some 
structure of patriarchy, which must be overcome in order to fully participate in public life. These 
structures take the forms of nationalist ideologies, emphasis on women’s maternal roles, and 
androcentric legal frameworks, among others. Indeed, what obstructs a comprehensive, 
defactionalized solidarity is not a lack of shared experiences between women, but the 
sociopolitical frameworks that prevent them from unifying under these experiences.  
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Limitations and Avenues for Further Study 
Questions of civic space, gender and political identity are deeply nuanced, and this study was 
limited to only a few facets of this subject. Further study should take place to more thoroughly 
explore the structures that influence Lebanese citizens’ relationships to the state and society, 
particularly among women. Although a significant amount of state power in Lebanon is held by 
the Maronite, Sunni, and Shi'a sects, these are not the only sectarian communities that affect the 
sectarian balance of the Lebanese system. There are eighteen recognized sects and fifteen 
religious courts, and consequently, there exist many more sectarian public spaces than were 
addressed in this study. In order to fully comprehend the position of Lebanon within a global 
context, we must also understand the ways in which these individual spaces interact.  
This study also addressed only the broad sociopolitical contexts in which Lebanese 
women interact with public spaces. However, equally important are the lived experiences of 
women within these spaces. As with any society, these experiences are influenced by many 
unique elements, and while sect is one of them, it is not the singular determining factor 
responsible for how individuals, or even organizations, navigate civic life. A comprehensive study 
of sectarianized spaces merely provides the foundation for a deeper exploration of these 
experiences. 
The stability of the Lebanese state and a strong civil society are crucial not only for 
Lebanon itself, but also for international politics and global civil society. Although it is a small 
country, Lebanon's importance within the international system of the 21st century is evident: it is 
situated at the precipice of ongoing tensions in the Middle East not only geographically, but also 
culturally and politically.  However, because of Lebanon's fragmented sociopolitical structure, it 
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is difficult to engage citizens in this important role on the international stage. Instead, it is 
external allegiances that continue to dictate the country’s domestic and foreign affairs. Nearly a 
century after the beginning of French colonization, “divide and rule” still dictates modes of 
citizen engagement in Lebanon. 
How, then, can these barriers be overcome? How can transnational actors engage 
Lebanese citizens, particularly Lebanese women, in international systems and global civil society? 
This is an important area of research which this study was unable to fully address. Due to 
Lebanon’s internal sociopolitical structures and histories of external interference, this kind of 
engagement could and should draw citizens and civil society into transnational spaces without 
upsetting the fragile social balance upheld by elite interests. Indeed, the balance between citizen 
engagement and proxy manipulation is at best delicate.  
Looking Forward: Gender, Sectarianism, and the Future of Lebanon 
Political sectarianism in Lebanon is a self-reproducing mechanism which bolsters the interests of 
the sectarian elite, as well as international patrons, which are maintained in the state and society 
of Lebanon. Even when there is no explicit sectarian conflict, the tensions remain both within 
and among sectarian communities as evidenced in the political evolution of the post-2005 
Lebanese state. As this study has demonstrated, the confessional identities that reinforce 
sectarian cleavages also produce gendered spaces unique to that identity. It is Lebanese women 
who ultimately find oppression within these sectarian structures of patriarchy, while 
simultaneously reproducing these structures as a way of navigating civic spaces. 
Today, Lebanon’s political stability is almost entirely dependent on the continued efficacy 
of this system. Any sectarian imbalance could plunge the country back into intercommunal 
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conflict in an already quickly destabilizing region. But measures to avoid such an outcome 
ultimately result in an equally detrimental political stalemate as demonstrated by the current state 
of the Lebanese government. This dilemma presents a particular challenge to civil society actors, 
who find themselves restricted by factionalized spaces and sect-based hierarchies. 
The solution to these issues will not be straightforward. Lebanese political sectarianism 
cannot simply be denounced in favor of secular governance. In order to dismantle and reform 
this complex system, the very foundations of modern Lebanese society must be restructured. It is 
as Maya Mikdashi has noted: "Calling for the end of political sectarianism is the same as calling 
for the end of the modern Lebanese state."1 However, the modern Lebanese state is already 
faltering – perhaps such an overhaul of existing structures is the only way to revive it. 
Beyond Lebanon: Conceptualizing Civic Space beyond Eurocentric Frameworks 
The conclusions reached within this study apply specifically to the context of civic spaces in 
Lebanon. However, much of this research can be employed in the study of broader concepts of 
social development and civic engagement in the developing world, particularly in the Middle 
East. Certainly, Lebanon shares a history of colonialism and continued external influence with 
other countries of the region. The framework of study presented here can be used to examine the 
development of civic spaces in other Middle East states in a way that challenges Eurocentric 
assumptions about civil society, civic engagement, and democratization. 
Lebanon is one of many states to experience geographic and demographic restructuring in 
the colonial and post-colonial period. Just as the territory of Mandate Lebanon was determined 
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in a way that serviced the strategic interests of France, the borders of neighboring countries were 
drawn with little consideration for ethnonational or confessional communities. Even after the 
region gained independence, it continued to serve as a focal point for proxy warfare during the 
Cold War (take, for example, U.S. and Soviet interventions in Afghanistan). Today, a large part 
of Middle East politics comprises a complex web of international alliances and external interests. 
This can be seen in the pressing interest of foreign governments, development agencies, 
and NGOs in the region. While interest in civil society, governance, and social development is 
not inherently negative, most approaches to these goals by Western actors operate within liberal-
secular Eurocentric frameworks which do not account for the diverse experiences of citizenship 
and civic spaces outlined in this study. By thinking more critically about the social, cultural and 
historical contexts in which these spaces have developed, efforts to promote civic engagement in 
these states can move beyond blanket solutions that homogenize the experiences of entire 
populations. If we recognize that the current sociopolitical conditions of a given country did not 
develop independently of domestic and international spheres of influence, we can better 
understand the parameters of its civic sphere and the barriers found within these spaces. 
Applying this critical framework is particularly important for women’s NGOs and 
“gender in development” efforts. It is important to recognize that women’s experiences and 
identities are not always universal, and that they will almost certainly vary based on the cultural 
contexts they navigate. This may vary by country, but it can also vary by community, as 
evidenced by the differing experiences of women within different sects in Lebanon. Because each 
sectarian community presents different barriers and points of entry to civic life, “engagement” of 
women within these communities would require different approaches. Recognizing these 
differences, as well as their historical roots in colonial statecraft and “colonial feminism,” is a 
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crucial step in developing a movement toward greater gender equality that is truly inclusive of all 
women. Unless concepts of agency, empowerment, and inequality can be understood as fluid and 
dynamic, and removed from a singular (i.e. liberal-secular) framework, such a movement will 
continue to be obstructed. 
Women across the world face different forms of structural inequality and navigate 
different spaces of patriarchy in their daily lives. Thus, the conclusions reached in this paper 
should not be applied as generalizations of the experiences of all women in the Middle East. 
This study only reflects a small sample of these experiences, but the frameworks it presents can 
be applied to other contexts. By challenging homogenized conceptions of citizenship, culture, 
and identity, Western governments and nongovernmental actors can more effectively approach 
social development, human security and post-conflict reconstruction in the region. 
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